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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THREE ESSAYS ON POPULATION DYNAMICS, TRADE AND GROWTH
Changes in immigration patterns and differential fertility choices shape the economies
of both developed and developing countries. However, these changes affect the economies
of developed and developing nations in different ways. This study aims to understand
the changes in population dynamics, brought about by differences in cross–country
differential fertility choices and migration patterns, and how these changes affect economic development via the channels of international trade and cross–country human
capital accumulation.
Chapter 1 discusses the background, data and literature on the patterns and
composition of immigration and international trade, which are further explored in
Chapter 2 for the world sample and in Chapter 3 for the U.S. and its trade partners.
Chapter 2 employs data on refugee and immigrant stocks for the years 1990–2005,
and compares the extent to which refugees and immigrants differentially affect trade
(exports and imports) with their home countries. The main contributions of Chapter
2 are: the high–dimensional fixed effect estimation of the immigrants’ and refugees’
effect on trade—a technique not previously applied within the immigration and trade
literature; differentiation between the effect of immigrants and refugees on trade in
commodity and differentiated product types for the world sample; and, finally, expanding the sample size beyond the countries and years considered in the previous
studies. Chapter 2 provides the first evidence of the differential refugee–immigrant
trade effect for the world sample, using the high–dimensional fixed effect estimation,
which controls for unobserved events correlated with both trade and migration decisions over time. I find that immigrants have a small positive (1.27%) effect on
differentiated exports to their home country, while refugees do not affect trade. I find
no evidence of immigrants or refugees affecting imports. These findings are different
from the previous research, which relied on using the augmented gravity approach
and estimated the effect of immigrants on trade to be anywhere between 4–6 percent
on exports and 5–7 percent on imports, respectively. Controlling for time–varying
multilateral resistance terms is one of the main contributions of the paper, as it allows for a better estimation of the effect of immigration on trade, and, contrary to
previous research, finds little evidence of immigrants’ and refugees’ effect on trade
with their home countries.
Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of immigrants and refugees on U.S. trade with their
home countries. More specifically, it explores the relationship between U.S. exports to
125 and imports from 100 immigrant and refugee countries of origin for the years 1990–
2005. I find that immigrants have a positive effect on differentiated exports (0.3%)
and have a negative effect on imports (affecting imports in differentiated products
more). I do to find an effect of refugees on either U.S. exports or imports from their
home countries.

Finally, Chapter 4 explores the cross–country differences in educational attainments, taking differential fertility rates into account. Differential fertility rate is the
difference between fertility rates of women with high educational attainment and
women with low educational attainment. In a country where differential fertility is
high, lower–educated women have more children than highly educated women but,
due to the highly persistent intergenerational transmission of human capital, the many
children born to lower–educated women also tend to have less education, decreasing
the future aggregate educational attainment and, potentially, reducing growth. In
contrast, in a country with initially lower differential fertility, the children of less educated women still receive less education (compared to the children of highly educated
women), but since they do not represent a large enough fraction of the population,
the decrease in the future aggregate level of human capital is not as stark. We document that and increase in differential fertility has a positive effect on future primary
enrollment ratios, and is negatively correlated to the total average years of schooling.
KEYWORDS: Immigration; Refugees; Trade; Differential Fertility, Human Capital
Accumulation
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Chapter 1 Background, Data and Literature Overview on Immigrants,
Refugees, Trade.

1.1

Introduction
Changes in immigration patterns and differential fertility choices shape the economies

of both developed and developing countries. However, these changes affect the economies
of developed and developing nations in different ways. This study aims to understand
the changes in population dynamics, brought about by differences in cross–country
differential fertility choices and migration patterns, and how these changes affect economic development via the channels of international trade and cross–country human
capital accumulation.
Chapter 1 discusses the background, data and literature on the patterns and
composition of immigration and international trade, which are further explored in
Chapter 2 for the “world sample” and in Chapter 3 for the U.S. and its trade partners.
Chapter 2 employs data on refugee and immigrant stocks for the years 1990–2005,
and compares the extent to which refugees and immigrants differentially affect trade
(exports and imports) with their home countries. The main contributions of Chapter
2 are: the high–dimensional fixed effect estimation of the immigrants’ and refugees’
effect on trade—a technique not previously applied within the immigration and trade
literature; differentiation between the effect of immigrants and refugees on trade in
commodity and differentiated product types for the world sample; and, finally, expanding the sample size beyond the countries and years considered in the previous
studies. Chapter 2 provides the first evidence of the differential refugee–immigrant
trade effect for the “world” sample, using the high–dimensional fixed effect estimation, which controls for unobserved events correlated with both trade and migration
decisions over time. I find that immigrants have a small positive (1.27%) effect on
1

differentiated exports to their home country, while refugees do not affect trade. I find
no evidence of immigrants or refugees affecting imports. These findings are different
from the previous research, which relied on using the augmented gravity approach
and estimated the effect of immigrants on trade to be anywhere between 4–6 percent
on exports and 5–7 percent on imports, respectively. Controlling for time–varying
multilateral resistance terms is one of the main contributions of the paper, as it allows for a better estimation of the effect of immigration on trade, and, contrary to
previous research, finds little evidence of immigrants’ and refugees’ effect on trade
with their home countries.
Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of immigrants and refugees on U.S. trade with their
home countries. Investigating the U.S. trade separately is relevant and important for
a number of reasons. First, the World Trade Organization (WTO) ranks the U.S. as
the world’s top import country and the second largest export economy in the world,
behind only China. Currently the U.S. accounts for almost 14% of total world imports
and nearly 10% of total world exports, ranking first in commercial services and second
in merchandise exports worldwide. Second, the U.S. remains the leading destination
for immigrants, hosting a diverse group of almost fifty million international migrants
which account for 19 percent of all immigrants worldwide. In addition the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that out of the 27
countries who who offered resettlement to over 100,000 refugees seeking sanctuary
in 2014, the U.S. has granted entry to 73% of those refugees. The growing number
of immigrants and refugees residing in the U.S. combined with a comprehensive list
of its trade partners and high trade volumes suggest that we should investigate the
relationship between immigration and trade for the U.S. separately and in more detail,
paying closer attention to the fact that these two distinct migrant types may affect
U.S. trade relations in different ways. Chapter 3 documents that immigrants have a
positive effect on differentiated exports (0.3%) and have a negative effect on imports

2

(affecting imports in differentiated products more). I do to find an effect of refugees
on either U.S. exports or imports from their home countries.
Finally, Chapter 4 explores the cross–country differences in educational attainments, taking differential fertility rates into account. Differential fertility rate is the
difference between fertility rates of women with high educational attainment and
women with low educational attainment. In a country where differential fertility is
high, lower–educated women have more children than highly educated women but,
due to the highly persistent intergenerational transmission of human capital, the many
children born to lower–educated women also tend to have less education, decreasing
the future aggregate educational attainment and, potentially, reducing growth. In
contrast, in a country with initially lower differential fertility, the children of less educated women still receive less education (compared to the children of highly educated
women), but since they do not represent a large enough fraction of the population,
the decrease in the future aggregate level of human capital is not as stark. We document that and increase in differential fertility has a positive effect on future primary
enrollment ratios, and is negatively correlated to the total average years of schooling.

1.2

Background on Immigrants and Refugees
International migration plays an important role in political, economic and social

development and is a high–priority topic for both developing and developed countries.
The recently increased focus of the policymakers towards worldwide migration has
been, for the most part, limited to the context of the immigrants’ effect on the
host countries’ labor market. In contrast, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, investigate the
economic benefits of migration via a channel of trade cost reduction, acknowledging
that migrants are potential facilitators of foreign trade.
The vast majority of migrants leave their home countries in search of better economic and social opportunities, others are forced to flee due to various types of

3

crises—like the current mass movement of refugees. In 2015, the number of people living outside their country of origin has reached 244 million people, or about
3.3 percent of the world’s population and constitutes a 41 percent increase compared to 2000. This number includes almost 20 million refugees, which represents the
highest level of forced displacement on record (UNPF (2015)). Such continuous and
rapid increase in worldwide migration further underscores the importance of studying
and understanding the differences in the economic implications of various immigrant
types.
The reasons for immigration vary by immigrant types. UNESCO defines a “migrant” as “a person for whom the decision to immigrate is taken freely and the
underlying reasons, guiding this decision, are those of “personal convenience” and
not a compelling intervention of any external factors.” Even though the choices for
immigration may be constraining, immigrants have more freedom in deciding on both:
the country choice of their future permanent residence and the timing of their decision to immigrate. The migration choices of refugees, displaced or compelled to leave
their countries for a variety of reasons, are much different. A “refugee”, is a person
who, “owing to well–founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events,
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”(UNPF (2015)).1 Both
1

Subsequent international documents and agreements (Cartagena Declaration on Refugees and
the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa) have expanded this
definition to include persons fleeing the general effects of armed conflict and/or natural disaster. A
crucial requirement to be considered a “refugee" is crossing an international border. People forcibly
displaced from their homes and cannot or choose not to cross a border are not refugees. Internally
displaced people, unlike refugees, do not have special rights, status or recognition specific to their
situation in international law.

4

Figure–1

(a) Immigrant Stock Country
Origins, 1990

(b) Immigrant Stock Country
Origins, 2005

(c) Refugee Stock Country
Origins, 1990

(d) Refugee Stock Country
Origins, 2005

Figure 1.1: World Immigrant and Refugee Stock (1990, 2005)
Note: Refugees and Immigrants from over 130 countries of origin residing in Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Norway, New Zealand, Spain,
Sweden or USA.

definitions are an indication that immigrants and refugees are two distinct migrant
types, and thus their effect on the economy, including the effect on trade with their
home countries, may also be different.
The choice of host countries differs for immigrants and refugees. About two thirds
of all worldwide migrants live in only 20 countries, with the United States being the
top migrant host country (hosts 19% of all migrants), followed by Germany and
Russia, both hosting around 5% of world migrants, and Saudi Arabia (4%). United
Kingdom, Canada, France and United Arab Emirates are all permanent host countries
for about 3% of world immigrants (UNPF (2015)).
In contrast, over half of all worldwide refugees come from only three countries—
Syria (4.9m), Afghanistan (2.7m), and Somalia (1.1m) and a little over half a million
refugees, as of 2015, reside in the U.S. The relatively smaller fraction of refugees
residing in the U.S. is not surprising, since the vast majority of refugees tend to

5

resettle in the countries more immediate (both in geographical and cultural proximity)
to their region, like Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon.
If we consider immigration specifically to the U.S., the immigrants from Mexico
constitute the largest group (almost 30%) of all the immigrants currently residing
in the United States. The United States also hosts about 4.5% of immigrants from
India, Philippines and China, which both account for about 4% of U.S. immigrants,
and Vietnam (3.2%).
According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, in 2004 one in seven
workers in the U.S. was born in a different country. Among the most important
reasons influencing immigration to the U.S. are family reunification, prospects of
better employment opportunities, and humanitarian needs.
In the U.S. especially, immigration policy remains a heavily debated and controversial topic with the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1990–1997) seeking
to limit legal immigration to the U.S. to approximately 550,000 immigrants a year.
However, despite the Commissions’ efforts, in 2010 one million immigrants obtained
legal permanent resident status in the U.S.. This trend is likely to continue to and
even increase in the future calling for a more detailed investigation of the immigrant’s
effect on the U.S. economic and trade relations. Important for such analysis is the
acknowledgment of the fact that not all migrants granted entry and residency in
the U.S. are the same, hence the way they may affect the U.S. economy may differ
based on their immigrant status. One example of a different immigrant sub–group are
refugees. This group differs in the motivation and timing of their relocation as well
as the choice of the new home country destination. United States has always hosted
refugees, however due to the increased forced displacement of people from countries
like Syria, Turkey, and Afghanistan, over 50,000 new refugees were admitted to the
U.S. in 2005 alone.
The maps provide a visual picture of the changes in composition and residency of

6

Figure–2

(a) Immigrant Stock Country
Origins, 1990

(b) Immigrant Stock Country
Origins, 2005

(c) Refugee Stock Country
Origins, 1990

(d) Refugee Stock Country
Origins, 2005

Figure 1.2: U.S. Immigrant and Refugee Stock (1990, 2005)
Note: Refugees and Immigrants from over 100 countries residing in the U.S. in 1990 and 2005.

immigrant and refugee stocks over time. Figures 1 (1.1a and 1.1b) show the maps of
immigrants from 134 origin countries in 1990 and 2005, respectively. Similarly, panels
1.1c and 1.1d show the refugees from 134 countries in 1990 and 2005. Whereas Figure
2 (1.2a and 1.2b) displays the immigrants and (1.2c and 1.2d) the refugees residing
in the U.S. in 1990 and 2005.
All maps show that not only did the total numbers of immigrants and refugees
increase over this 15–year period, but the composition of the host countries has also
varied over time. The figures are consistent with the statistics on world migration
patterns, and provide further support for studying the differential effect of immigrants
and refugees on international trade.

7

1.2.1

Literature on Immigration and Trade

Migration patterns have significant economic consequences for both the sending
and receiving countries. These economic consequences are often not clear, and with
such unprecedented levels of international migration, we need more reliable studies
that identify and analyze the trends and effects of migration across various immigrant categories. Ongoing debates over immigration and trade policies furthermore
underscore the importance of a better and more complete understanding of this topic.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 contribute to the existing literature in several ways.
First, Chapter 2 uses global panel data, allowing me to introduce time–varying multilateral resistance terms (importer–year, exporter–year, and country pair fixed effects). The inclusion of time–varying multilateral resistance terms in Chapter 2,
allows me to control for events and policies that are correlated with both trade and
immigration over time, thus making the estimates of the immigrant elasticities on
trade more robust. For example, an ongoing war in Syria or recent civil conflicts in
Angola, Burundi, or Egypt, both reduce trade with those countries but also increase
migration out of these countries, leading to a spurious negative correlation. Introducing importer–year fixed effects allows me to capture the variation better than a
more traditional use of gravity–type variables like “Conf lictjt ”. Similarly, an open
border policy change in a host country could lead to both an increase in exports and
immigration, resulting in a spurious positive correlation, which I capture with the it
exporter–year fixed effect.
Gravity models traditionally rely on dummy variables like “T radeAgreementit ”,
to capture the whether the trade partners are part of a trade agreement or “Conf lictjt ”
to indicate whether the country is involved in an ongoing conflict. These variables
are imperfect since they measure the presence but not the magnitude or intensity of
such events. In panel data, the fixed effects approach is preferable since it deals with
the measurement problems in such variables better. In addition global panel data
8

allows me to estimate the “average effect” of immigrants across all countries, instead
of relying on a single case study, as has been done in the previous literature.
In Chapter 2, I find a small statistically significant effect of immigrants on differentiated exports: a 10% increase in immigrant stock increases exports to their home
country by 1.2% (compared to some of the previous estimates of over 8%); refugees
do not have a statistically significant effect on exports. Imports are not statistically
affected by either the presence of immigrants or refugees in the host country.
Second, in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I examine the differential effect of
immigrants and refugees on trade with their home countries. Previous research has
found that immigrants increase host country imports from their respective country of
origin because they have preferences for home country goods which are scarce in the
new host market. White and Tadesse (2007) refers to this channel as “transplanted
home bias”. Immigrants also have knowledge of their home country markets and, by
exploiting this channel, may increase exports to their home country. Dunlevy (2006)
describes this channel as the “information bridge hypothesis”, which utilizes immigrants’ knowledge of home country business practices, language, and institutional and
market differences.
In contrast, refugees are an artifact of an ongoing war, civil or ethnic violence,
political unrest, social, racial or religious persecution in their home country, and are
placed in their host countries more randomly than immigrants. Therefore, refugees
may minimize the endogeneity problem within the immigrant–trade literature. Looking at the differential effect of these two migrant groups separately will allow for a
better understanding of the roles that different immigrant subgroups play in influencing their host–home country commercial relationships and aid in the formulation of
appropriate social policy. To my knowledge, Chapter 2 is the first attempt to look at
the differential effect of immigrants and refugees on trade with their home countries
using a world sample (134 origin countries and 14 host countries for the period 1990-
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2005). Head and Ries (1998) have performed the analysis of the differential immigrant
effect on Canadian trade with 136 partners from 1980–1992. The authors consider
refugees as one of the subcategories of immigrants and find no effect of refugees on
exports and a positive effect on imports, where imports increase by 0.33% for each 1
percent increase in immigrant stock).
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on U.S. trade by expanding the sample and
time period with data on U.S. exports to 125 and imports from 100 immigrant and
refugee origin countries for the period 1990–2005. In addition, I differentiate between
exports and imports in commodity and differentiated product types and two types
of migrants—immigrants and refugees. Similar analysis for the U.S. and its trade
partners was undertaken by Gould and Ruffin (1996) and White and Tadesse (2010).
However, my study is different from both of these in a couple of ways. Unlike Gould
and Ruffin (1996) I differentiate between immigrant and product types as well as
control for the time fixed effects. White and Tadesse (2010) differentiate between the
immigrants’ and refugees’ effect on U.S. trade with their home countries, and finds
a pro–trade effect of both immigrants and refugees on U.S. trade with their home
countries. While I resort to similar interpolation technique as White and Tadesse
(2010) to calculate the stock of immigrants residing in the U.S., I do not construct or
interpolate the refugee stocks like they do. Instead, I utilize the refugee stock data
provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which
makes my measure of refugee stocks more reliable. In their paper, White and Tadesse
(2010) classify both asylees and refugees as refugees, however UNHCR as well as the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) define an asylum–seeker
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and a refugee differently.2 Given the differences in the procedures and definitions of
asylees and refugees and to better investigate the differential effect of immigrants and
refugees on trade, I only account for the persons who are classified by the UNHCR
as refugees. In their paper, White and Tadesse (2010) fail to control for any form of
conflict in the immigrant or refugees origin country, which may both hinder U.S. trade
with those countries and increase the influx of refugees. Since refugees are an artifact
of an ongoing war, persecution, civil or ethnic violence, a better way of estimating
the relationship would be to control for the presence of an ongoing conflict in the
refugees’ home country. I introduce a dummy variable “Conflict”, which captures
the existence of an ongoing conflict in the immigrant and refugees home country. In
addition, White and Tadesse (2010) restrict their study to 1996–2001, while I am able
to expand the panel and investigate the differential relationship between immigrants
and refugees on U.S. trade for 1990–2005 period. Furthermore, I control for country–
pair and year fixed effect, while White and Tadesse (2010) only control for time fixed
effects.
The results in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 confirm that immigrants affect differentiated exports more than exports in commodity products. In contrast, I do not
find evidence of the immigrants’ or refugees’ effect on imports for the world sample.
However, I observe a negative effect of immigrants on U.S. imports from their home
countries. The results on the effect of refugees on trade fall short of statistical significance in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. I do not find that refugees affect either
2

According to the definitions provided by both agencies, an asylum seeker is someone who has
filed a petition for sanctuary but has not been granted one yet her or she may already reside on the
U.S. territory awaiting the approval for the refugees status. In contrast, a person seeking refugee
status may do so only from outside of the U.S. While some refugees may have been asylum seekers at
some point in time, unlike asylum seekers, refugees have been granted sanctuary and their requests
for relocation were not denied by either the UNHCR or the host country’s government. A person may
maintain the asylum seeker status until the review of his or her application petition is completed.
In contrast, an asylum seeker whose application successfully passed the review and who has been
granted sanctuary becomes a refugee.
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imports or exports, while Head and Ries (1998) finds that refugees have a positive
effect on imports. The differences in my findings could be attributed to a number
of things: the fact that I use global panel and investigate the “average” effect of
both immigrants and refugees; the use of different estimation technique (Head and
Ries (1998) utilizes a gravity approach); as well as the use of different data and time
periods.
Numerous studies have examined the relationship between trade and immigration
and have found that this relationship is robust to the use of different samples, model
specifications, and product types. Genc et al. (2012) provide a detailed review of the
most influential and relevant literature on trade and immigration. They summarize 48
papers which have looked at the effect of immigration on trade. There are no papers
which have performed the analysis for a global panel of countries and, to my knowledge, Chapter 2 is the first attempt to analyze the differential effect of immigrants
and refugees on trade, using a panel of multiple origin and destination countries. The
closest paper which has consider immigration and trade relationship for a global panel
is Tadesse and White (2015). The authors investigate whether immigrants are associated with a reduction in transaction costs associated with trade. The authors examine
data from 174 immigrant home countries and 19 OECD member host countries from
1995–2010 and document that 10% increase in the immigrant stock corresponds to a
1.04% decrease in total bilateral trade costs between the two trade partners. Differentiating between manufactured and agricultural products, Tadesse and White (2015)
find that the effect of immigrants on trade cost reduction is pronounced for both
product types.
Among the papers which have examined the effect of immigration specifically
on U.S. trade, using a panel analysis, are Gould (1994), Jansen and Piermartini
(2009), and White and Tadesse (2010). However, both Gould (1994) and Jansen and
Piermartini (2009) and White and Tadesse (2010) are not directly comparable to my
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study for a number of reasons described below.
Gould (1994) has a smaller sample (around 720 observations) and does not differentiate between commodity and differentiated exports (imports) or between immigrant group types. He reports that immigrants increase aggregate exports by 0.3%
(for each 10% increase in immigrant stock) and 0.4% for aggregate imports. The paper controls for country fixed effects, however, does not include time fixed effects. The
results reported by Gould (1994) may, therefore, capture the simultaneous growth in
immigration and trade, and not the true causal effect of immigration on trade.
Jansen and Piermartini (2009) look at temporary migrants to the U.S. and, using a
gravity regression, find that temporary migration has a positive and significant effect
on trade and that temporary migration tends to have a stronger and more significant
effect on both imports and exports than permanent migration. However, unlike my
analysis, they do not differentiate between immigrant categories or product types.
White and Tadesse (2010) consider the differential effect of immigrants and refugees
on U.S. trade with their home countries and their analysis is most relevant to what
I do in Chapter 3. The authors uncover that immigrants and refugees have a different effect on trade. As mentioned previously, their paper does not include country
fixed effects and focuses on a shorter, less recent time period. For the U.S. and
its 59 trade partners over the period 1996–2001, the authors document a positive
influence of immigrants on U.S. imports and exports and a minimal and insignificant influence of refugees. The authors report that a 1% increase in immigrant
results in a 0.27% increase in aggregate exports and 0.13% increase in aggregate imports. White and Tadesse (2010) document that refugees have a small positive effect
on non–manufactured exports and a small negative effect on manufactured imports.
Non–manufactured exports increase by 0.06%, while manufactured imports decrease
by 0.08% for each 1% increase in refugee stock.
Expanding the panel to 1995–2000 and accounting for U.S. exports to 125 and
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imports from 100 immigrant and refugee origin countries, I do not find an effect on
aggregate exports while differentiated exports increase by 0.3% for each 1% increase
in immigrant stock. Additionally I find a negative effect on imports with immigrants
decreasing aggregate imports by 0.6% and differentiated and commodity imports
by 0.7% for each 1% increase in immigrant stock. Contrary to White and Tadesse
(2010) I do not document any effect of refugees on U.S. trade in aggregate, commodity
or differentiated products. However, my results are not directly comparable to the
findings of White and Tadesse (2010). Unlike my study in which I control for both the
country–pair and year fixed effects, White and Tadesse (2010) include only time year
dummies and fail to control for country–fixed effects. In addition, I also control for
the the existence of an ongoing conflict in the immigrant and refugees home country,
to reflect the variation in both trade between the two countries and the out–migration
from the immigrant and refugees origin coutures.
In addition Hatzigeorgiou (2010) analyzed the effect of immigration on trade for
Sweden and its multiple immigrant origin trade partners. Hatzigeorgiou (2010), using
the gravity model, examines the link between migration and trade flows for Sweden
and its 180 trade partners between 2002 and 2007 using the gravity approach. The
author reports a statistically strong positive immigration–trade relationship, particularly for trade in differentiated goods. Hatzigeorgiou (2010) attributes the pro–trade
effect to the immigrants’ ability to decrease information costs between Sweden and
their home countries. A 1% increase in immigrant stock results in 0.6% increase in
aggregate exports to the immigrants’ country of origin. Aggregate imports increase
by 0.9% for each 1% increase in immigrant stock. The author reports comparable
magnitudes for immigrants’ effects on trade in differentiated products. I use the augmented gravity approach, controlling for both time and destination fixed effects, and
find that immigrants have a small positive effect on differentiated exports (0.3%) and
have a negative effect on imports (affecting imports in differentiated products more).
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I do not find an effect of refugees on either U.S. exports or imports from their home
countries.
Lewer and Van den Berg (2009) examine the importance of six channels through
which immigration may influence trade. Using a panel data (16 OECD countries and
a large set of immigrant source countries for the years 1991–2000) and a three-stage
least-squares (3SLS) model, the authors find that immigration stimulates bilateral
trade. Specifically, a 10 percentage point increase in immigrant flow increases total
trade between the host and home countries by nearly 5 percentage points. Lewer
and Van den Berg (2009) suggest that the three channels that affect the relationship
between immigration and trade the most are: foreign direct investment flows to the
immigrants’ home countries, newly established trade networks between immigrants
in origin and host countries, and increases in income per capita in the immigrant host
countries.
In addition, Head and Ries (1998) analyzes Canadian trade with 136 trade partners from 1980 to 1992. Head and Ries (1998) use data on Canadian immigrants
to examine the effect on trade with their countries of origin. They analyze five
categories of immigrants—immigrants as a result of family reunification, refugee–
immigrants, immigrant–entrepreneurs, immigrant–investors, and other independent
categories and discover that the “other independent” immigrant category, has a significant positive effect on trade. This effect is found to be larger than the “family
reunification” effect. The authors report the refugee–immigrant category effect to be
significantly lower than any other category of immigrants.
Among cross–sectional studies which have examined the immigrant–trade link
are: Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999), Felbermayr and Toubal (2012), Girma and Yu
(2002), Peri and Requena-Silvente (2010), and Rauch and Trindade (2002). Dunlevy
and Hutchinson (1999) and Girma and Yu (2002), find that migration creates incentives for domestic host country firms to produce relevant substitutes for the home
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products demanded by migrants.
Rauch and Trindade (2002) and Felbermayr and Toubal (2008) do not consider
immigration directly, instead they focus on large concentrations of ethnic Chinese
immigrants in the host county, and estimate the effect of the global ethnic Chinese
network on global bilateral trade. Using the gravity equation and taking the shares of
ethnic Chinese population into account, Rauch and Trindade (2002) find that countries with higher fractions of ethnic Chinese residents trade more with each other, and
Felbermayr and Toubal (2008) report that high–skilled Chinese migrants contribute
more to bilateral trade. Both studies document more trade in differentiated than
homogeneous products.
Peri and Requena-Silvente (2010) examine the effects of immigrants on the extensive (effect on the number of transactions) and intensive (effect on the average value
per transaction) margins of exports in Italian provinces. The authors report that
immigrants increase both the number of transactions and the value per transaction
in exports for the receiving host country. The authors highlight that this pro–trade
effect is stronger for more differentiated rather than commodity products. In their
analysis, they consider 142 countries of origin and 103 Italian host provinces, using a
standard gravity regression with origin and destination fixed effects.
The literature is not clear on whether immigrants influence exports more than
imports or vice versa. Results reported by Gould (1994) and Girma and Yu (2002)
find that immigrants’ influence on host country exports is greater than their influence
on imports. However, White and Tadesse (2007) and Head and Ries (1998) report
pro–import trade effects of immigrants which exceed the pro–export effects. My
results for both, the world sample estimates in Chapter 2 and the estimates for the
U.S. only (Chapter 3), support the former finding of Gould (1994) and Girma and
Yu (2002).
Furthermore, international trade is associated with substantial fixed costs not
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limited to transportation costs, but the costs associated with the scarcity or inconsistency of the information about the foreign markets. For example, the culture, legal
systems, norms and customs for business transactions may differ across countries,
resulting in increased costs of establishing and maintaining exports and imports with
the trade partners. Immigrant networks may reduce the information costs and facilitate a more efficient flow of information. Immigrants possess inherent proficiency in
the business and cultural customs and norms, as well as tastes preferences in their
origin country markets, and may use this information to substantial reduce trade
costs, increasing both external and internal margins of trade. It has been previously documented by Rauch (1999), Rauch (2001), Rauch and Trindade (2002), and
Tadesse and White (2010) that immigrant networks have a stronger impact on trade
in differentiated products. Commodity products (e.g. aluminum alloys, woven fabrics, frozen vegetables, etc.) have more substitutes and common characteristics across
countries. In contrast, differentiated products, like radio-telephonic devices, books,
or medicaments, to name a few, may be less familiar to migrants and require more
familiarization with their applications and use. Since immigrants have the language
proficiency, deeper of the home market customs and norms, they can channel this
information and familiarization process easier and facilitate more trade in differentiated products. Specifically Rauch (1999) estimates that immigrants increase exports
in differentiated product types by 0.86% and in in commodity products types by
0.63% for each 1% increase in stock; Tadesse and White (2010) find that differentiated exports rise by 0.28% and commodity exports by 1.5%, while differentiated and
commodity imports by 0.28% and 0.22%, respectively.
To date, the majority of empirical research has not accounted for the fact that the
immigrants’ influence on the economy may differ by their entry classification. The
few empirical studies that do make this distinction are Cortes (2004), Head and Ries
(1998) and Khan (1997). Only Head and Ries (1998) examines the differential effect
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of immigrants and refugees specifically on trade.
Head and Ries (1998) use data on Canadian immigrants to analyze the effect of
immigrants on trade with their countries of origin. They examine five categories of
immigrants, including refugee category and document that refugees category effect on
Canadian trade is significantly lower than the effect of any of the other four immigrant
categories.
Cortes (2004) differentiates between the immigrants and refugees and their human capital investments and wage assimilation. The author utilizes the data from
the Integrated Public Use Samples (IPUMS) of the United States Census and documents that refugees initially have lower annual earnings, but their annual earnings
grow faster than the earnings of immigrants over time. Cortes (2004) discovers that
compared to immigrants, refugees invest more in human capital.
Khan (1997), examines investments in human capital by immigrant and refugee
men in the U.S. The author finds that refugees have a higher probability of investing
in additional schooling compared to immigrants.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 both differentiate between the differential effect of immigrants and refugees on trade, which allows to better understand the roles that these
distinct immigrant subgroups play in influencing their host–home country commercial
relationships and a better formulation of appropriate social policies.
Finally, the previous literature has focused on gravity equations to estimate trade
and migration flows and has provided evidence that the direction of causality runs
from immigration to trade. Among some of the factors which may affect the decision
to immigrate and trade are the distance between the two trading partners (both geographic and cultural), the presence of previous historical ties, similarities in political
systems as well as the overall “openness” to trade and investment between the two
countries.
Trade literature has relied on the gravity approach to control for these factors,
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however, since most of these factors tend to promote both immigration and trade,
the process of establishing the direction of true causality has proved to be challenging
and lead to upward bias in estimates of the immigration effect on trade, especially
in cross–country studies. The gravity equation doesn’t deal well with the issue of
heteroskedasticity present in the panel data. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that in
panel data the use of log–linearized models estimated by OLS (like the augmented
gravity approach) leads to biased elasticity estimates. The authors demonstrate that
heteroskedasticity affects both the traditional gravity estimation by Tinbergen (1962),
as well as the more recently used augmented gravity estimation techniques like Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). Even the studies that include most of the observable
country characteristics, still fail to completely control for the unobserved time–varying
variables, leading to biased results.
One way to minimize the effect of unobserved variables is to control for country–
pair fixed effects, exporter–time and importer–time fixed effects. The high–dimensional
fixed effects estimation (HDFE) technique, proposed by Guimarães and Portugal
(2009), has not been previously applied to study the effect of immigration on trade
and is one of the main contributions of this paper. The HDFE procedure allows me
to introduce more than two fixed effects and have a more detailed and robust estimation of degrees of freedom, especially when there are fixed effects nested within
clusters (like clustering on the immigrants’ country origins). In addition, it is more
robust to addressing the possible collinearity issues within the fixed effects. Changes
in institutions, differences in the immigrants’ host and home country’s economic environments, financial crises or economic booms may affect both trading partners, and
the amount of trade and immigration between them. However these changes may
not necessarily manifest themselves at the same time, which makes it even more important to introduce the exporter–importer, exporter–year and importer–year fixed
effects as additional controls.

19

In Chapter 2, where I have a panel of multiple origin and destination countries,
I estimate the effect of immigrants and refugees on trade using two approaches—a
high–dimensional fixed effects estimation, using importer–year, exporter–year, and
importer–exporter fixed effects, proposed by Guimarães and Portugal (2009) and
tested by Head and Mayer (2013), as well as the, more traditionally used, augmented
gravity approach proposed by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). In Chapter 3,
where the destination is U.S. only, I resort to the more traditional augmented gravity
estimation technique, using the time and the destination (immigrant and refugee
origin) fixed effects.

1.2.2

Data on Immigrants, Refugees and Trade

Trade data are extracted from the World integrated Trade Solutions (WITS)
database, collected and maintained by the World Bank. WITS provides data on
the distribution, volume and content of exports and imports by product nomenclature for all trade partners in the world. In Chapter 2, I use the data on exports and
imports between 14 immigrants and refugees host countries and 134 countries of their
origin for the years 1990—2005. In Chapter 3, I use a bilateral dataset of trade between the U.S. and its 100 import and 125 export partners from 1990-2005. The data
for both exports and imports are collected at SITC (Revision 2) 4 digit level codes,
which allow me to observe bilateral annual exports and imports in detail, by product
type. I then use James Rauch’s product classification (Rauch (1999)) to construct
bilateral aggregate, commodity and differentiated exports and imports from product
types. Rauch categorizes the SITC (Revision 2) industries into three possible product types: differentiated, commodity (homogeneous) and reference priced. Previous
literature, which utilized Rauch’s classification to construct differentiated and commodity exports and imports, used the differentiated and commodity categories, and
did not consider the reference priced category. Here, I also focus on two categories:
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differentiated and commodity products.
Data on immigrant stocks are constructed using the UNPF (2015) and Kim and
Cohen (2010). Data on immigrant stocks are taken from the United Nations Statistical Database (UNSD) and are available for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005.
I use immigrant flow data from Kim and Cohen (2010) to interpolate intervening
years, resulting in bilateral immigrant stock data from 1990—2005. In addition data
on refugee stock, which allow me to look at the differential effect of immigrants and
refugees on trade, come from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), and contain annual refugee stocks for the years 1990—2005 (UNHCR
(2015)).
Data on GDP come are from the Penn World Tables 8.1 and data on standard
gravity measures (common language, distance, regional trade agreements) from The
Centre d‘Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII)—a French
research center in international economics (Institute for Research on the International
Economy, Methodology (2001)).
Data on international and country–specific conflict come from the Center for Systemic Peace. The center maintains data on the major episodes of political violence
and warfare (MEPV) between 1946-2014. MEPV defines major episodes of violence as
systematic episodes of lethal violence resulting in at least 500 directly–related deaths
over the course of the episode. Episodes can range from international and civil wars
to ethnic and civil violence, and are assigned a societal–systemic magnitude impact
ranging from 0 to 10. Any category which receives a score above 7 is an example of a
hypothetical conflict.3 There are two reasons for this. First, during 1990–2005 there
were no conflicts with a severity level above 5.4 Second, most contemporary warfare
3

In the time period analyzed in Chapters 2 and 3, there are no conflict episodes with a score
above 5.
4
WWI and WWII, for example, are both assigned a score of 7.
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locations lack the necessary military technologies for a conflict magnitude over 7.
Using the available conflict categories, I create a dummy variable (Conf lict)jt , which
is assigned a value of 1 if the major episode is greater than 3, otherwise (Conf lict)jt
is equal to zero.5

5
More detailed explanation of the conflict categories and magnitudes can be found in the Appendix.
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Chapter 2 Differential Effect of Immigrants and Refugees on Trade with
their Home Countries.

2.1

Introduction
Employing data on refugees and immigrants from 134 countries of origin and

14 destination countries for the years 1990—2005, I compare the extent to which
refugees and immigrants differentially affect trade (exports and imports) with their
home countries, and provide the first evidence of this differential refugee–immigrant
trade effect for the world sample. Using the high–dimensional fixed effect estimation
allows me to control for unobserved events correlated with both trade and migration
decisions over time. I find that immigrants have a small positive effect on differentiated exports to their home country (1.3%), while refugees do not affect trade. I do
not find evidence that immigrants or refugees affect imports.

2.2

Empirical Model Specification
The gravity equation has been the preferred empirical method in international

trade and immigration literature Tinbergen (1962). Despite the fact that it provides
a good fit for most datasets of regional and international trade, it leads to biased
parameter (elasticity) estimates under heteroskedasticity assumptions in panel data.
Here I estimate the effects of immigrants and refugees on trade using two approaches: a high dimensional fixed effects (HDFE) estimation proposed by Guimarães
and Portugal (2009) and tested by Head and Mayer (2013) and a more traditional
augmented gravity method suggested by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003).
Using a bilateral data set of exports and imports between 14 migrant–destination
countries and 134 countries of their origin over the period 1990—2005, I separate the
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effects of immigrants and refugees on trade with their home countries. Controlling
for the exporter–year, importer–year and exporter–importer fixed effects accounts
for the observable and unobservable time variant trade costs (multilateral resistance
terms) between the two trading partners. HDFE estimation absorbs any dynamic
forces that may change over time (such as GDPs, population growth, conflict, etc.).
and affect both the trade and immigration decisions. This estimation technique has
been proposed by Guimarães and Portugal (2009), and tested by Head and Mayer
(2013), however, not previously applied within the trade–immigration literature. I
also estimate the model using a more traditional augmented gravity approach with
exporter, importer and time fixed effects, proposed by Anderson and Van Wincoop
(2003).
An equation for exports with multilateral high–dimensional fixed effects takes the
following form:1

ln(Exports)ijt = β1 ln(Immigrants)ijt−1 + β2 ln(Ref ugees)ijt−1 + β3 RT Aijt +
+ θit + ωjt + δij + ijt (2.1)

In equation (1) each observation is an immigrant host (i), immigrant origin (j),
and year (t) country-pair of exports (imports). (Exports)ijt is the exports (aggregate,
commodity or differentiated) from one of the 14 immigrant host countries to one of the
134 immigrant origin countries, (Immigrants)ijt−1 is the immigrant stock residing in
the host country in the previous year, (Ref ugees)ijt−1 is the refugee stock residing
in the host country in the previous year, RT Aijt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the two trading partners have a regional trade agreement in place in a given year,
θit is the exporter-year fixed effects, ωjt is the importer–year fixed effects, δij is the
exporter-importer fixed effect, and ijt is the error term.
1

Similarly for imports the dependent variable is ln(Imports)ijt .
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For a robustness check, and to be able to compare my preferred specification to the
ones previously used in the literature, I also estimate an augmented gravity equation
proposed by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), for which I use equation (2) below:

ln(Exports)ijt = β1 ln(GDP )it + β2 (Conf lict)jt + β3 (RT A)ijt +
+ β4 ln(Immigrants)ijt−1 + β5 ln(Ref ugees)ijt−1 + ζij + µt + ijt (2.2)

where each observation is an immigrant host (i), immigrant origin (j), and time (t)
country-pair. The estimation yields results comparable to the previous literature.

2.3

Results

2.3.1

Aggregate Exports

Table 2.1: HDFE: Aggregate Exports
(Exports with no Ref)

(Exports with Ref)

RTA

0.081
(0.069)

0.080
(0.069)

Imm stock

0.066
(0.042)

0.059
(0.043)

Ref stock

0.010
(0.011)

Obs.
Exporter-Year fixed effects
Importer-Year fixed effects
Exporter-Importer fixed effects

5,509
Y
Y
Y

5,509
Y
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Correlation between refugee stock and immigrant stock is 0.085. Both regressions have exporteryear, importer-year and exporter-importer f.e.

Results reported in Table 2.1, where I control for exporter–year, importer–
year and exporter–importer fixed effects, show that neither immigrants nor refugees
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have a significant effect on exports to their home countries. Introducing additional
bilateral controls allows us to control for events that are correlated with both trade
and migration patterns over time. The magnitude of the coefficients is similar to
Table A.1, but HDFE estimation absorbs most of the variation so the significance is
lower. Column 1 of Table 2.1, shows that immigrants do not have an effect on exports
to their home countries. When I allow for a differential effect of refugees, the results
do not change. This is not surprising, given the presence of high dimensional fixed
effect. Any kind of turmoil is likely to increase both the influx of refugees, and a
decrease in trade between the two partners. However, (Conf lict)jt used in regression
(1), only captures one dimension of other variables that may affect the relationship,
and the country–year (importer–year, exporter–year) fixed effects may be better at
capturing the effect of refugees on exports.
Table A.1 presents the results for aggregate exports from 14 immigrant–host countries to 134 immigrants-origin countries using the augmented gravity regression estimation. Column (2) allows for a differential effect of refuges. Looking at the results
in the first column of Table A.1, we see immigrants have a modest effect on exports
to their home countries (a 10% increase in immigrant stock in the host country increases the aggregate exports to the country of origin by 0.9%), while refugees have a
slight negative effect (a 10 percent increase in refugee stock, decreases exports to their
home country by 0.2%). These estimates are much lower than the results reported by
Hatzigeorgiou (2010), however, he only considers Sweden and its trade partners, and
reports a 6 percent increase in aggregate exports for additional 10 percent increase
in immigrants.

2.3.2

Commodity and Differentiated Exports

Previous research has pointed out that immigrants may affect exports in commodity and differentiated product types differently. Rauch (1999), Rauch (2001),
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Rauch and Trindade (2002), Dunlevy (2006), White and Tadesse (2007), Tadesse and
White (2010) all posit that immigrant networks have a stronger impact on trade in
differentiated products.
Commodity products like agricultural products, textiles, and raw materials require less familiarity and additional information in the process of establishing a trade
relationship, since most of these products have common characteristics and substitutes across countries. In contrast, differentiated products like apparel, shoes, and
electronics may vary more across countries and cultures. Some varieties of differentiated products may be more strongly preferred by some countries and because of
variations in product type and quality, network effects may be more important for
differentiated products than for commodities. Immigrants through their knowledge of
language, customs, and home markets, can decrease the information costs associated
with establishing the trade connections in differentiated products and facilitate more
trade in these products.
Table 2.2: HDFE: Commodity and Differentiated Exports
(Comm noref) (Comm ref) (Diff noref) (Diff ref)
RTA

0.152
(0.102)

0.151
(0.102)

-0.010
(0.077)

-0.011
(0.077)

Imm stock

0.097
(0.062)

0.092
(0.063)

0.127***
(0.047)

0.121**
(0.047)

Ref stock

Obs.
Exporter-Year fixed effects
Exporter-Importer fixed effects
Importer-Year fixed effects

0.006
(0.016)
5,509
Y
Y
Y

5,509
Y
Y
Y

0.009
(0.012)
5,509
Y
Y
Y

5,509
Y
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
Correlation between refugee stock and immigrant stock is 0.085. All regressions have
exporter-year, importer-year and exporter-importer f.e.

HDFE results are presented in Table 2.2 and find that immigrants have a positive
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effect on exports in differentiated product types—a 10% increase in immigrant stock
results in a 1.27% increase in differentiated exports (1.2% when refugees are accounted
for in column 4). The effect of immigrants on differentiated exports is stronger than on
commodity exports or aggregate exports, providing further support for the immigrant
network channel. Refugees do not have a significant effect on either commodity or
differentiated exports.
The augmented gravity results for aggregate exports, reported in Table A.2, are
similar to the HDFE results for aggregate exports, reported in Table 2.2, and demonstrate a positive, although smaller, effect of immigrants on differentiated exports.
Looking at columns 3 and 4 of the augmented gravity Table A.2, we observe that
immigrants alone account for a 1.5% increase in differentiated product types (for
each 10% increase in immigrant stock) and when introducing refugees separately in
(column 4), we see that this immigrant effect stays the same. I fail to find evidence
of an effect of immigrants on commodity exports. This finding confirms the previous
literature finding that immigrants affect trade in differentiated type products more.
Refugees do not have an effect on differentiated exports, but do have a slight negative
effect on exports in commodity products (-0.6%).

2.3.3

Aggregate Imports

According to Head and Ries (1998) immigrants’ effect on imports and exports
may be different. Immigrants may have a direct impact on imports because of their
preferences for goods produced in their home country. This effect is likely to be
larger for differentiated rather than commodity products, where there is little reason
to prefer products sourced from a specific country and the “specific” variety may be
unavailable locally. Since international trade imposes much higher costs than domestic transactions, setting up an export connection requires finding potential markets,
accessing distribution channels, and local product demand in foreign environments.
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The importer, on the other hand, needs to find a reliable source of the product supply. Both export and import activities require knowledge of local customs, laws,
traditions, and markets. These requirements could be facilitated by the immigrants’
knowledge of their home countries’ language, customs, laws, traditions, and markets.
These factors lower the transactions costs for both exports and imports, however they
may do so differentially. Elasticities for imports may be higher, because the knowledge of the home market may increase both imports and exports, but preferences
for home–country goods increases only imports. Immigrants may also have similar
preferences as the native population in the host country, but they may find it easier
to set up importing businesses rather than exporting businesses.
Table 2.3: HDFE: Aggregate Imports
(Imports noref)

(Imports ref)

RTA

0.175*
(0.093)

0.176*
(0.093)

Imm stock

-0.012
(0.060)

-0.010
(0.061)

Ref stock

-0.002
(0.015)

Obs.
Importer-Year fixed effects
Exporter-Year fixed effects
Importer-Exporter fixed effects

4,903
Y
Y
Y

4,903
Y
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
Correlation between refugee stock and immigrant stock is 0.085. Both regressions have
importer-year, exporter-year and importer-exporter f.e.

Table 2.3, controls for high dimensional fixed effects. Column 1 of Table 2.3
enters immigrant stock separately and finds no significant effect; once we estimate
the effect of immigrants and refugees differentially (Column 2), again I do not observe
a significant effect of either refugees or immigrants on aggregate imports.
Applying the augmented gravity estimation, results presented in Table A.3, we
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observe a pro–trade effect of immigrants (0.9% increase in aggregate imports for
each 10% increase in immigrant stock), while refugees have a slight negative effect on
aggregate imports (0.3% increase in aggregate imports for each 10% increase in refugee
stock). Column 2 of Table A.3 for the augmented gravity estimation reports similar
findings to the primary HDFE specification Table 2.3, discussed earlier. Immigrants
exhibit a positive effect on aggregate imports resulting in a 1.2% increase in aggregate
imports for each 10% increase in immigrant stock, while refugees do not seem to affect
imports in aggregate.

2.3.4

Commodity and Differentiated Imports

Table 2.4 reports the results for the commodity and differentiated imports regressions using the high dimensional fixed effects estimation. Controlling for the
exporter–year, importer–year and exporter–importer fixed effects, I do not find a significant effect of immigrants on commodity or differentiated imports. When allowing
for a differential effect of refugees, there is no evidence of a significant effect on either
commodity or differentiated products. Refugees do not have a significant effect on
imports in commodity or differentiated products.
Immigrants exhibit a slight positive effect on imports in differentiated products,
when using the augmented gravity approach. Table A.4 estimates the regressions
using the augmented gravity approach and reports that a 10% increase in immigrant
stock is associated with a 1.3% increase in commodity imports from their home country (1.4% when controlling for refugees). There is a slight positive significant effect
of immigrants on imports in commodity products types when controlling for refugees
separately. A 10 percent increase in immigrant stock in the host country raises commodity imports to the host country by 0.1% in Column 2. Refugees do not have a
significant effect on either commodity or differentiated imports to their host country.
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Table 2.4: HDFE: Commodity and Differentiated Imports
(Comm noref) (Comm ref) (Diff noref) (Diff ref)
RTA

0.204
(0.131)

0.200
(0.131)

0.137
(0.099)

0.135
(0.100)

Imm stock

(0.085)

(0.086)

(0.064)

(0.065)

Ref stock

Obs.
Importer-Year fixed effects
Exporter-Year fixed effects
Importer-Exporter fixed effects

0.014
(0.021)
4,903
Y
Y
Y

4,903
Y
Y
Y

0.003
(0.016)
4,903
Y
Y
Y

4,903
Y
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
Correlation between refugee stock and immigrant stock is 0.085. All regressions have
importer-year, exporter-year and importer-exporter f.e.

2.4

Conclusion
Employing data on refugees and immigrants from 134 countries of origin and 14

destination countries for the years 1990—2005, I differentiate between the immigrant
and refugee effect on exports and imports in commodity and differentiated products.
I find that immigrants have a more pronounced effect on exports rather than imports,
affecting differentiated exports more than commodity exports. My results support
the findings of Gould (1994) and Girma and Yu (2002) that immigrants’ influence on
host country exports is greater than their influence on imports. I also confirm the
previous literature’s suggestion that immigrants affect differentiated product types
more via the network effect.
Controlling for importer–year, exporter–year, and exporter–importer fixed effects,
I demonstrate that a 10 percent increase in the stock of immigrants exhibits a positive
effect on differentiated exports increasing them by 1.3 percent. The magnitude of
this effect is almost five times smaller than previously documented, highlighting the
importance of using high dimensional fixed effects, which better control for unobserved
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time–varying factors that affect both trade and immigration patterns. I fail to find
an effect of immigrants on exports in aggregate.
For the HDFE estimates, the results for exports rather than imports may be
stronger due to the fact that the longer the immigrant stock resides in the host
country, the stronger the immigrant link becomes. Using the HDFE estimation,
the effect of the stock of immigrants on aggregate imports, as well as imports in
commodities, falls short of statistical significance. The explanation for such finding
may be that with time and aging of the immigrant stock, the preferences for home
products may weaken or go away completely. Since imports are more likely subject
to the immigrants’ strong preferences for their home country products, with time this
channel of trade may lose importance.
In contrast, refugees do not have a significant effect on exports from their home
countries in either commodity or differentiated products. Refugees also do not seem
to have a pronounced effect on imports (aggregate, commodity or differentiated).
These findings may be attributable to a couple of things. First, the use of timevarying country specific multilateral resistance terms (high–dimensional fixed effects),
which allowed me to control for any events correlated with both trade and migration
decisions over time, may have captured the variation in the placement of the refugees
better than a typical augmented gravity regression. Refugees are also relatively more
exogenous than immigrants when considering the decision to relocate, and for that
same reason, may be less familiar with the host country markets, culture, language,
traditions, etc. Additionally, refugees are a very specific and a much smaller group of
migrants. They may not wish to maintain any ties with their home countries, or not
have an opportunity to do so, due to an ongoing conflict, or fear of persecution.
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Chapter 3 Differential Effect of Immigrants and Refugees on U.S. Trade
with their Home Countries.

3.1

Introduction
Employing data on imports from 100 and exports to 125 immigrant and refugee

home countries, I provide the first evidence of the differential refugee–immigrant trade
effect for the U.S. and its trade partners. This paper finds that immigrants have a
positive effect on exports in differentiated product types, increasing the exports in
differentiated products by 3.3% for a 10% increase in immigrant stock. I do not find an
effect of immigrants on exports in commodities. Immigrants have a negative effect on
aggregate imports, with a slightly more negative effect on imports in differentiated
products. Refugees, do no have an effect on either exports or imports from their
countries of origin.
Among the most relevant papers to this study are Gould and Ruffin (1996), Head
and Ries (1998), White and Tadesse (2010) and Tadesse and White (2015). Gould
and Ruffin (1996) find that immigrants, residing in the U.S., have a negative effect
on aggregate exports—a 10% increase in immigrant stock leads to a 0.3% decrease
in exports, while imports rise by 0.4%. Head and Ries (1998), using Canadian trade
data with 136 partners from 1980 to 1992, find that a 10% increase in immigrants is
associated with a 1% increase in Canadian exports to the immigrant’s home country
and a 3% increase in imports. White and Tadesse (2010) consider the differential
effect of immigrants and refugees on U.S. trade with their home countries for the U.S.
and its 59 trade partners over the period 1996–2001. The authors document that an
increase in immigrant stock by 1% results in a 0.27% increase in aggregate exports
and 0.13% increase in aggregate imports. I do not find an effect on aggregate exports
while differentiated exports increase by 0.3% for each 1% increase in immigrant stock.
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Additionally I find a negative effect on imports with immigrants decreasing aggregate imports by 0.6% and differentiated and commodity imports by 0.7% for each 1%
increase in immigrant stock. My results are not directly comparable to the findings
of White and Tadesse (2010) since I differentiate between commodity and differentiated product types, while they estimate the immigrant effect on non–manufacturing
and manufacturing exports and imports. White and Tadesse (2010) document that
refugees have a small positive effect on non–manufactured exports and a small negative effect on manufactured imports. Non–manufactured exports increase by 0.06%,
while manufactured imports decrease by 0.08% for each 1% increase in refugee stock.
Contrary to their findings I do not document any effect of refugees on U.S. trade in
aggregate, commodity or differentiated products.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. I expand the
sample and time period with data on U.S. exports to 125 and imports from 100
immigrant and refugee origin countries for the period 1990–2005. I also differentiate
between exports and imports in commodity and differentiated product types and two
types of migrants—immigrants and refugees.

3.2

Empirical Model Specification
This paper is using the augmented gravity approach with exporter, importer and

time fixed effects, proposed by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). I demonstrate
that immigrants increase exports in differentiated product types by 3.3% for each 10%
increase in immigrant stock, while I not find any effect on exports in commodities.
These findings are aligned with the results in the previous literature and provide
further support for the immigrant network channel. Immigrants have a negative effect
on aggregate imports, with a comparable negative effects on imports in differentiated
products than on commodity imports). Refugees, do no have an effect on either
exports or imports from their countries of origin.
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The primary equation is presented below:1

ln(Exports)ijt = β1 ln(GDP )jt + β2 (Conf lict)jt + β3 (RT A)ijt +
+ β4 ln(Immi)ijt−1 + β5 ln(Ref )ijt−1 + θj + µt + φijt (3.1)

where each observation is an immigrant host (i), immigrant origin (j), time (t) pair
of aggregate exports from the U.S. to their immigrant origin partner countries in a
given year. (Exports)ijt is the exports (aggregate, commodity and differentiated)
from the U.S. to the immigrants’ and refugees’ home country, (GDP )jt is the GDP
in the immigrant origin country in a given year, (Conf lict)jt is a categorical variable,
equal to 1, if the country of immigrants’ and refugees’ origin is involved in an ongoing
political or social unrest, religious or racial persecution, civil, ethnic or violence or
war in a given year, (RT A)ijt is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the trade partners
are currently part of a bilateral trade agreement, (Imm)ijt−1 is the immigrant stock
residing in the U.S. in the previous year, (Ref )ijt−1 is the refugee stock residing in
the U.S. in the previous year, θj is the export (immigrant origin) fixed effect, µt is
time fixed effect, and φijt is the error term.

3.3

Results

3.3.1

Aggregate Exports

Table 3.1 presents the results for aggregate exports from the U.S. to 125 immigrant
and refugee-origin countries. Column (2) allows for a differential effect of refuges.
Looking at the results in the first column of Table 3.1, we see that neither immigrants
nor refugees have an effect on aggregate exports to their home countries.
Column (2) allows for a differential effect of refuges. Looking at the results in the
1

Similarly for imports the dependent variable is ln(Imports)ijt .
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Table 3.1: Aggregate Exports from the U.S. to 125 immigrant-origin countries.
(Exports no Ref)

(Exports with Ref)

Real GDP immi origin

0.117
(0.083)

0.114
(0.082)

Conflict immi origin

0.101
(0.089)

0.100
(0.090)

RTA

-0.001
(0.083)

0.006
(0.081)

Immigrant stock

0.002
(0.101)

0.028
(0.108)

Refugee stock

Obs.
Year fixed effects
Destination fixed effects

-0.010
(0.012)
1,035
Y
Y

1,035
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
Correlation between refugee stock and immigrant stock is 0.032.

first column of Table 3.1, we see that neither immigrants nor refugees have an effect
on aggregate exports to their home countries. White and Tadesse (2010) report that
a 1% increase in immigrant stock results in a 0.27% increase in aggregate exports.
The differences between our findings could be attributed to my use of country–pair
fixed effects which capture the time–invariant characteristics of the trade partners
better than the controls like Seaportj or Englishj used by White and Tadesse (2010).
Similar to my findings the authors do not find any effect of refuges on aggregate
exports.

3.3.2

Commodity and Differentiated Exports

Previous research has pointed out that immigrants may affect exports in commodity and differentiated product types differently. Rauch (1999), Rauch (2001),
Rauch and Trindade (2002), Dunlevy (2006), White and Tadesse (2007), Tadesse
and White (2010) posit that immigrant networks have a stronger impact on trade
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in differentiated products. Commodity products have more substitutes and common
characteristics across countries. Differentiated products may be completely unknown
or have a lot of asymmetric information associated with them. Since immigrants
possess the knowledge of language, customs, and home markets, they can exploit this
asymmetric information and facilitate more trade in these differentiated products.
Table 3.2: Commodity and Differentiated Exports from the U.S. to 125 immigrantorigin countries.
(Comm noref)

(Comm ref)

(Diff noref)

(Diff ref)

Real GDP immi origin

0.147
(0.112)

0.140
(0.112)

0.127
(0.109)

0.122
(0.107)

Conflict immi origin

0.105
(0.115)

0.101
(0.116)

0.150
(0.125)

0.146
(0.125)

RTA

-0.178**
(0.077)

-0.160**
(0.077)

0.122
(0.130)

0.137
(0.125)

Immigrant stock

-0.164
(0.163)

-0.103
(0.172)

0.280**
(0.110)

0.333***
(0.108)

Refugee stock

Obs.
Year fixed effects
Destination fixed effects

-0.022
(0.020)
1,035
Y
Y

1,035
Y
Y

-0.020
(0.013)
1,035
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01,
Correlation between refugee stock and immigrant stock is 0.032.

∗∗

1,035
Y
Y
p<0.05,

∗

p<0.1.

Once exports are disaggregated into commodity and differentiated product types,
the results change slightly, and are reported in Table 3.2. Immigrants have a slight
positive effect on differentiated exports on their own (a 10% increase in immigrant
stock results in a 2.8% increase in differentiated product exports to the country of
their origin). When introducing refugees separately, we do not observe refugees affecting exports in differentiated products, while immigrants do exhibit a positive effect,
increasing differentiated exports by 3.33% for each 10% increase in their stock in the
host country. The results for differentiated products are comparable to the findings
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of White and Tadesse (2010), who report a 2.9% increase in manufacturing exports
increase for each 10% increase in immigrant stock and consistent with the previous literature’s finding that immigrants affect exports in differentiated type products more
than in commodities. In contrast to White and Tadesse (2010), who report that non–
manufacturing exports increase by 1.9% for each 10% increase in immigrant stock, I
do not find that immigrants affect commodity exports.

3.3.3

Aggregate Imports

Table 3.3: Aggregate Imports to the U.S. from 100 immigrant-origin countries.

Real GDP immi origin
Conflict immi origin
RTA
Immigrant stock

(Imports noref)

(Imports ref)

0.600∗∗∗
(0.144)

0.603∗∗∗
(0.144)

−0.212
(0.129)

−0.210
(0.130)

1.110∗∗∗
(0.417)

1.102∗∗∗
(0.419)

−0.612∗∗∗
(0.154)

−0.641∗∗∗
(0.160)

Refugee stock

0.010
(0.019)

Obs.
Year fixed effects
Origin fixed effects

1,028
Y
Y

1,028
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Correlation between refugee stock and immigrant stock
is 0.027.

According to Head and Ries (1998) immigrants’ effect on imports and exports
may be different. Immigrants may have a direct impact on imports because of their
preferences for goods produced in their home country. This effect is likely to be
larger for differentiated rather than commodity products, where there is little reason
to prefer products sourced from a specific country and the “specific” variety may be
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unavailable locally. Since international trade imposes much higher costs than domestic transactions, setting up an export connection requires finding potential markets,
accessing distribution channels, and local product demand in foreign environments.
The importer, on the other hand, needs to find a reliable source of product supply.
Both export and import activities require knowledge of local customs, laws, traditions,
and markets. These requirements could be facilitated by the immigrants’ knowledge
of their home countries’ language, customs, laws, traditions, and markets. These
assets lower the transactions costs for both exports and imports, however they may
do so differentially. Elasticities for imports may be higher, because the knowledge of
the home market may increase both imports and exports, but preferences for home–
country goods increases only imports. Immigrants may also have similar preferences
as the native population in the host country, but they may find it easier to set up
importing businesses rather than exporting businesses.
In Table 3.3, which presents the regression results for the aggregate imports I
find that immigrants have a negative effect on aggregate imports, lowering aggregate
imports by 0.6% for each 10% increase in the immigrant stock. This is also true for
the results reported in Column 2 of Table 3.3 where we observe a differential effect
of immigrants and refugees. In contrast, White and Tadesse (2010) report a positive
effect with immigrant stock increasing aggregate imports by 1.3% for each 10% increase in stock. However, the authors find that refugees lower aggregate imports by
0.5% as a result of a 10% increase in refugee stock.

3.3.4

Commodity and Differentiated Imports

Table 3.4 reports a negative significant effect of immigrants on imports in differentiated product types while refugees again fail to exhibit significant effect on imports
in both commodities and differentiated products.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.4 demonstrate that immigrants have a negative effect
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Table 3.4: Commodity and Differentiated Imports to the U.S. from 100 immigrantorigin countries.
(Comm noref)

(Comm ref)

(Diff noref)

(Diff ref)

0.815***
(0.218)

0.816***
(0.216)

0.326**
(0.129)

0.330**
(0.129)

Conflict immi origin

-0.161
(0.213)

-0.160
(0.214)

0.019
(0.161)

0.022
(0.161)

RTA

-0.006
(0.153)

-0.008
(0.154)

1.079***
(0.416)

1.069**
(0.419)

Immigrant stock

-0.723**
(0.308)

-0.731**
(0.329)

-0.689***
(0.152)

-0.726***
(0.163)

Real GDP immi origin

Refugee stock

Obs.
Year fixed effects
Origin fixed effects

0.003
(0.027)
1,028
Y
Y

1,028
Y
Y

0.013
(0.020)
1,028
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01,
Correlation between refugee stock and immigrant stock is 0.027.

∗∗

1,028
Y
Y
p<0.05,

∗

p<0.1.

on commodity imports decreasing them by 7.3% for each 10% increase in immigrant
stock. Similarly, immigrants lower imports in differentiated products by 7.1% for
each 10% increase in immigrant stock. Refugees, on the other hand, have no effect
on commodity or differentiated imports from their home counties. The results do not
demonstrate that there is a distinction between commodity and differentiated goods
or inclusion of refugees with the point estimates consistent for all types of imports
to the coefficient estimates reported in Table 3.3. In contrast, White and Tadesse
(2010) uncover that immigrants increase manufacturing imports by 3% and refugees
lower manufacturing imports by 0.8% as both of their stocks in the U.S. rise by 10%.
The authors do not report any effect of immigrants or refugees on non–manufacturing
imports.
Theoretically, the unobserved bilateral factors, captured by country–pair fixed
effects, may be either positively or negatively correlated with immigrant networks.
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Empirically estimated negative effect of immigrants on aggregate, commodity and differentiated imports, however, may be indicative of an increased host–country production of the products, which immigrants previously imported from their origin countries
and now produce locally. Most immigrants and refugees come from less developed
countries, where the variety and product sophistication is much lower compared to
the host country. Over time, when the stock of immigrants in the host country grows,
it may be more reasonable to establish the production of both differentiated and commodity products locally, due to the higher demand by a substantially large stock of
immigrants. Establishing production of differentiated products locally, justified by
the substantial local demand may result in lower demand for differentiated product
imports from the immigrants’ home–countries. For example, the largest immigrant
stock residing in the U.S. is from Mexico and not surprisingly, there is a diverse and
substantially large chain of Mexican stores located in the U.S., catering to the local
demand for authentic (differentiated) Mexican products.
Commodity products, on the other hand, are similar across countries, and thus the
effect of immigrants may be less pronounced. In addition, the host country market
offers a variety of local commodity product alternatives, the use and application of
which is familiar to the foreigners. The abundance of commodity product substitutes
offered in the local host markets, makes the costs associated with importing commodity products from the immigrants’ home–country unreasonably high, resulting in
lower imports.

3.4

Conclusion
Employing data on refugees and immigrants from over 100 countries of origin re-

siding in the U.S. over the period of 1990—2005, I differentiate between the immigrant
and refugee effect on exports and imports in commodity and differentiated products.
My results for immigrants are contrary to the findings of White and Tadesse
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(2010), who also differentiate between the immigrants’ and refugees’ effect on U.S.
trade and document a positive effect of immigrants on U.S. imports and exports. I
do not uncover any effect of immigrants on exports and find a negative effect on imports with immigrants decreasing aggregate imports by 0.6% and differentiated and
commodity imports by 0.7% for each 1% increase in immigrant stock. On the other
hand, White and Tadesse (2010) document a 0.27% increase in aggregate exports
and 0.13% increase in aggregate imports for a 1% increase in immigrant stock. The
authors differentiate between manufactured and non–manufactured exports and imports, while I consider a wide variety of product differentiation, thus the results of
our studies may not be directly comparable.
However the results of our studies are more aligned on the effect of refugees on
U.S. trade with their home countries, suggesting that the effect of refugees is smaller
compared to the effect of immigrants. White and Tadesse (2010) finds that non–
manufactured exports increase by 0.06%, while manufactured imports decrease by
0.08% for each 1% increase in refugee stock, while I do not find any effect of refugees
on exports or imports.
The positive effect of immigrants on differentiated exports is comparable to previous literature estimates, however, the negative effect on imports has not been previously documented. The negative impact of immigrants on differentiated imports may
be attributed to the fact that as the stock of immigrants grows in the host country
over time, substantially increasing the local demand for differentiated products, the
domestic production of differentiated products in the host country increases, while
the differentiated product imports from the immigrants’ home country fall. Similarly,
there is a wide variety of commodity product alternatives available in the host country
market. These products, their use and application are also familiar to immigrants,
thus making it unreasonably costly to import these products from the immigrants’
home–country, resulting in lower commodity imports.
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Chapter 4 Effect of Differential Fertility on Cross–Country Human
Capital Accumulation

4.1

Introduction
Despite the expansion of educational opportunities through the internationally

agreed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) project, UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2006) report found 124 million children and youth were out of school and 757
million adults, two thirds of whom are women, could not read or write. Human capital, however, plays a central role in neoclassical models of long–run economic growth
and is a fundamental empirical determinant of income levels. Given the importance
of educational attainment for economic development, it is important to understand
its determinants.
This paper focuses on the role of differential fertility as a determinant of future educational attainment. Differential fertility rate is the difference between fertility rates
of women with high educational attainment and women with low educational attainment. In a country where differential fertility is high, low–educated women have more
children than highly educated women but, due to the intergenerational transmission
of human capital, one can expect the many children born to low–educated women to
also have low education, which will lower future aggregate educational attainment,
(potentially) reducing growth. In the opposite case, when differential fertility is lower,
the fertility difference is not as stark and, even though, the children of less-educated
women will still receive less education (compared to the children of highly educated
women), they do not constitute a large enough fraction of the population to substantially reduce the future aggregate level of human capital and, in turn, slow down
economic development (De La Croix and Doepke (2003)). Our hypothesis is that,
all else equal, a higher differential fertility has a negative effect on the future human
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capital accumulation (which may lead to lower economic growth).
Additionally, differential fertility rates can have a different effect on human capital
accumulation, depending on the initial level of human capital. In a country with low
initial human capital level, less–educated women will, on average, have a lot more
children, than more highly–educated women. The children of less–educated women
will then, in turn, achieve low levels of education and, due to their large majority,
they will lower the aggregate level of future human capital. In contrast, in a country
that starts off with a higher initial level of human capital, less educated women will
have lower educated children, but the educational attainment of these lower educated
children will not be significantly lower than the level of education of children of highly
educated women, due to the overall lower proportion of lower educated children.
Important for our analysis of educational attainment is the consideration of public
provision of education within a country. Provision of public education allows for better
access to schooling for children of both rich and poor families and may result in an
overall higher level of human capital within a country. In a country where differential
fertility is high, public provision of education may play an even more important role
in increasing future educational attainment, by making schooling more accessible for
poor families. The effect of public education provision on differences in cross–country
human capital accumulation has not been empirically tested, however, it has been
shown that public provision of education increases economic growth. For example,
De la Croix and Doepke (2004) argue that in countries with highly unequal human
capital, public provision of education reduces differential fertility rates, and increases
economic growth.
Finally, higher initial levels of income inequality within a country are positively
correlated with total differential fertility rates, which may lead to lower levels of future
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human capital.1 If a country has lower levels of inequality, differential fertility rates
may not be as important in predicting future human capital levels, because more
people can get a better education. However, if a country is more unequal, differential
fertility rate is expected to have a negative effect on future educational attainment.
Chiu (1998) in their theoretical model demonstrate that higher income inequality
leads to lower human capital accumulation and economic growth.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in a couple of ways. First, it
empirically tests the underlying hypothesis of De La Croix and Doepke (2003) that
differential fertility is a determinant of future educational attainment. Second, it adds
to the literature on the determinants of human capital accumulation, by broadening
the scope of the empirical analysis with a cross–country sample of 61 developed and
developing countries.2

4.1.1

Literature Review

The level of human capital in a country can be affected by a variety of factors and,
consequently, there are many papers which have examined human capital accumulation. Among some of the papers are: Becker and Tomes (1976) looking at human
capital formation in the presence of credit frictions; Chiu (1998) analyzing human
capital accumulation and economic growth, taking income inequality into account;
Boucekkine et al. (2002) and De La Croix and Doepke (2003) on the relationship between demographics and schooling; Castro and Coen-Pirani (2012), Rangazas (2000),
and Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) on schooling across time in the United States.
Many of these papers, however, do not explain differences in schooling and/or
returns to schooling across countries, and the few papers that examine cross–country
1

Correlation coefficient between differential fertility rate and the Gini coefficient is 0.47.
The sample drops to 48 countries when the regression is estimated using the primary enrollment
ratio as a measure of future educational attainment.
2
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schooling differences, like Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) and Hendricks (2010), fail
to account for cross–country fertility rate differentials. For example, Manuelli and
Seshadri (2005) find that schooling is related positively to wages and that differences
in wages lead to large differences in schooling across countries. Hendricks (2010) analyzes the relative difference in the share of skilled–to–unskilled labor as a determinant
of future human capital investment and finds that within–industry skill differences
account for the majority of the cross–country differences in educational attainment.
However, Hendricks (2010) uses individual level data aggregated to the country level
and only has 28 countries in his sample.
In contrast to the large literature on the determinants of human capital, the
literature on how differential fertility affects human capital accumulation, is rather
small. Among the papers that have examined differential fertility and how it is related
to educational attainment are De La Croix and Doepke (2003) and Kremer and Chen
(2002).
De La Croix and Doepke (2003) explain differences in growth rates across countries, using total differential fertility rates (DTFR), and find that differential fertility
has a statistically significant, negative effect on economic growth in a sample of developed and developing countries. The authors specify that differential fertility is a
function of income distribution, and it tends to increase with income inequality, thus,
countries with higher inequality tend to have less human capital and slower growth
rates. In countries with higher income inequality, poor parents tend to have more
children and invest less in their education, disproportionately increasing the number
of children with low education. This further widens the differential fertility rate,
and lowers the average level of education within a country. However, De La Croix
and Doepke (2003) do not explicitly show that the negative effect of DTFR happens
through the human capital accumulation channel.
Kremer and Chen (2002) build a theoretical model with an assumption that chil-

46

dren of educated (high skilled) workers are more likely to also become educated, and
this contributes to the growth of the fertility differential within a country. This growth
in DTFR, disproportionately increases the fraction of the unskilled (low educated)
labor force, decreases their wages, and leads those workers to face lower opportunity
cost of having additional children. Kremer and Chen (2002) show that this leads to
a vicious cycle. The authors find that fertility rate differentials are greater in countries with more income inequality, but there are multiple equilibria, suggesting that
increasing access to education (more generous provision of free public education) may
lead to the reduction of the fertility rate differential and income inequality. However,
lack of public education provision and the presence of credit frictions may reduce the
educational attainment.
The importance of accounting for human capital differences has also been highlighted in explaining cross-country growth rates in some of the seminal papers like
Mankiw et al. (1992) and Hall and Jones (1999). Mankiw et al. (1992) test the predictive power of the Solow growth model in a cross–country setting and demonstrate that
augmented Solow model, that accounts for accumulation of human capital, explains
not only cross–country differences in the standards of living, but also convergence in
the standards of living. Hall and Jones (1999) show that differences in capital (both
physical and human) offer only a partial explanation of cross–country differences in
income per capita. The authors attribute differences in capital accumulation, productivity and economic growth to the differences in institutions and government policies
across countries.
In addition, Apostolova-Mihaylova (2014) evaluates the effect of differential fertility rates on economic growth, taking the levels of educational attainment into account.
She finds that differential fertility rates matter for economic growth. In a sample of
68 countries, a country that is highly unequal and has higher fertility rates of women
with lower education, benefits from the higher differential fertility rate and has a
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higher economic growth rate. However, for more equal countries, higher levels of
differential fertility disproportionately increase the proportion of unskilled–to–skilled
labor, leading to lower economic growth. Apostolova-Mihaylova (2014) finds that
highly unequal countries are typically poor and have higher ratios of unskilled–to–
skilled workers. For such countries an increase in the relative proportion of unskilled
labor may have a positive effect on growth rates. In contrast, developed countries
have lower inequality and relatively higher skilled labor force, but an increase in differential fertility rate decreases the share of skilled labor, and has a negative effect
on future growth rates.
The issue of endogeneity between income inequality and human capital has been
addressed within the growth literature by a variety of methods, including, but not
limited to, using lags and IVs. Empirical literature on the determinants of human
capital, however, has failed to control for the initial level of income inequality within
a country. Chiu (1998), in his theoretical model, demonstrates that higher income
inequality leads to lower human capital accumulation and economic growth. The author utilizes an overlapping-generations model with income and talent heterogeneity.
In his model higher initial income inequality leads to lower aggregate human capital
accumulation. The author argues that the children of poor and rich parents are born
with similar talents, but the children born into rich families have more education
than the children born into poorer families, leading the children of “rich” parents to
have better opportunities to develop their innate talent. Assuming a redistribution
of wealth from “rich” to “poor” the author documents that the aggregate level of
human capital increases. Aggregate levels of human capital are one of the important
determinants of economic growth, and Chiu (1998) demonstrate that an exogenous
increase in income inequality, lowers the aggregate level of human capital and causes
a decrease in economic growth.
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4.2

Data
Cross–country differential fertility rates were calculated using the total fertility

rates (TFR) by women’s educational attainment from Kremer and Chen (2002). TFR
in Kremer and Chen (2002) is interpreted as the expected number of children per
woman conditional on her living until the end of her reproductive years and adhering
to age–specific fertility schedule. The original data on TFR come from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and from the World Fertility Survey (WFS). Total
Differential Fertility Rate (DTFR) used in this paper is calculated as in De La Croix
and Doepke (2003) and is equal to the difference between the total fertility rate (TFR)
of women with low educational attainment and women with high educational attainment in a given country. Differential fertility ranges from -0.6 in Trinidad and Tobago
in 1987, to 5.1 in Ecuador in 1979.3
Data on GDP per capita come form the Penn World Tables Version 9.0 (PWT).
Data on the total levels of educational attainment come from Barro and Lee (2013).
As a measure of future educational attainments I use both the total average years of
schooling and the primary school enrollment ratios. Data on Gini coefficients come
from the Deininger and Squire (1996) high quality Gini coefficient dataset, which has
become a primary source of cross–country data on income inequality. Deininger and
Squire (1996) do not have Gini coefficients available for all of the countries and years
in my data. I use the earliest available Gini coefficient for each period. As a proxy
for the public provision of education we use government expenditure on education
as a percentage of GDP. Data on the government expenditure on education as a
3

Both DHS and WFS measure fertility rates by the mother’s education level differently across
countries. In WFS, fertility rates are reported by “low” and “high” levels of education. The “low”
education category refers to the education levels somewhere between zero and six years of schooling,
depending on the country, while the definition of “high” may be above seven or above ten years of
schooling. In DHS, the categories correspond to primary and secondary levels of schooling, but all
of these are also measured differently across countries.
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percentage of GDP come from the World Development Indicators (WDI) data. The
WDI do not have government expenditure on education available for all the countries
and years in our data. For the countries for which the initial government expenditure
on education is available it is measured at the beginning of the period, otherwise
within the period. More detailed variable descriptions are included in the Appendix.
I define two periods in our analysis of the effects of differential fertility on human
capital accumulation. Period 1 is 1974-82 and period 2 is 1985-93. DTFR is not
measured in consistent years across countries, and we use the earliest observation of
the differential fertility during the period 1974-78 for period 1 (1974-82), and during
1985-90 for period 2 (1985-93). Initial levels of human capital (average years of
schooling and primary schooling enrollment ratios) are measured in 1975 and 1985,
however, our variable of interest—the predicted level of human capital is measured in
1995 for period 1 and in 2005 for period 2. The predicted human capital is measured
using the average years of schooling as well as the primary schooling enrollment ratios
(for a robustness check). Both variables used as measures of predicted human capital
are measured in 1995 and 2005. Initial levels of GDP per capita are measured in 1974
and 1985. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A.14.

4.3

Empirical Model Specification
The baseline specification is presented below:

(HK)it = β1 (DT F R)it−1 + β2 (HK)it−1 + β3 ln(GDP cap)it−1 + θi + µt (4.1)

where HK is is the total average years of schooling or primary enrollment ratio in
country (i) at time period (t) (where t corresponds to either 1995 or 2005) as a
function of explanatory covariates: (DT F R)it−1 is the initial total differential fertility
rate, (HK)it−1 is the total average years of schooling at the beginning of the period,
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ln(GDP cap)it−1 is the initial GDP per capita at the beginning of the period, θi is the
country fixed effect, and µt denotes a time period fixed effect.
In addition to the baseline specification outlined above, we also estimate regressions with: ((GovtExpEducGDP (%))it−1 ) as a proxy for the public provision of education, the initial level of income inequality ((Gini)it−1 ), an interaction term between
the initial level of human capital and differential fertility rate ((HK ∗ DT F R)it−1 ),
and between the Gini coefficient and differential fertility rate (Gini ∗ DT F R)it−1 ).
Results and discussion of all empirical specifications are outlined in the next section.

4.4

Results
Table 4.1 presents the results for all regression specifications using total average

years of schooling to measure educational attainment, while Table 4.2 reports the
results with the primary enrollment ratios as a measure of educational attainment.
Discussion of the results begins with Table 4.1.
Column (1) of Table 4.1 presents the baseline model specification (equation 1),
which does not include any interaction terms. All five regression specifications demonstrate that the differential fertility rate is negatively correlated with the future average
years of schooling. In column (3), where I control for the initial level of income inequality, the coefficient on DTFR is negative and statistically significant at 10%,
suggesting that as the differential fertility rate increases by one child during period 1
or period 2, it is associated with a 0.2 year decrease in the average years of schooling
15 to 20 years later at the end of the respective period. Column (5), where I introduce and interaction term between the initial level of income inequality and DTFR,
reports that the direction of the relationship between the initial DTFR and future
average years of schooling varies based on the initial level of income inequality within
a country. In countries with the initially higher income inequalities (Gini coefficients
above 58.8), DTFR is correlated positively with the future average years of schooling.
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Table 4.1: Panel Estimation with Fixed Effects. Dependent Variable is Total Average
Years of Schooling.
(1)

(2)

(4)

(5)

DTFR

-0.095
(0.118)

IniEducTotal

0.852*** 0.917*** 0.836*** 0.823*** 0.858***
(0.124) (0.115) (0.110) (0.130) (0.106)

LnRGDPcap

0.881
(0.579)

GovtExpEducGDP(%)

-0.128
(0.132)

(3)

-0.202** -0.235
(0.092) (0.172)

-0.647**
(0.318)

0.588
(0.552)

0.297
(0.362)

0.229
(0.532)

0.249
(0.428)

-0.150
(0.165)

-0.209
(0.137)

-0.210
(0.141)

-0.144
(0.157)

Gini coeffcient

-0.050** -0.052** -0.057***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.017)

DTFRxIniEducTotal

0.010
(0.038)

DTFRxGini

Obs.
Prob>F (DTFR+DTFRxIniEducTotal)
Prob>F (DTFR+DTFRxGini)
Period fixed effects
Country fixed effects

0.011
(0.008)
61

61

61

61
0.12

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses

∗∗∗

p<0.01,

∗∗

p<0.05,

61
0.04
Y
Y
∗

p<0.1.

In contrast, countries with initially lower income inequalities (Gini coefficients below
58.8), exhibit a negative correlation between the initial differential fertility rate and
educational attainment 15 to 20 years later.
Using the government expenditure on education as a proxy for public provision of
education in column (2), I do not find that it has a statistically significant effect on
the future educational attainment. The effect of this proxy variable is quantitatively
similar across all five specifications. These results are contrary to my original hypothesis that public education provision may result in an overall higher level of human
capital within a country, especially for highly unequal countries. One explanation for
such results could be that the government expenditure on education as a percentage
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of GDP, may be an imperfect proxy for the public provision of education within a
country as well as across countries, since this variable does not specify whether this
expenditure goes towards primary education, secondary, or both. Another explanation may be that changes in the government education expenditures may take a long
time to affect the average years of schooling within a country, and, given that both
panels are fairly short (at most 20 years), we do not the observe the effect yet.
As demonstrated theoretically by Chiu (1998) the level of initial inequality within
a country has a negative effect on its future human capital accumulation. Countries
with higher levels of inequality also have higher total differential fertility rates.4 For
example, Ecuador has a high Gini coefficient of 67.8 and a high differential fertility
rate of 5.1 at the beginning of period 1. Ecuador also has on average 4.3 years of
schooling at the beginning of period 1, and 6.2 years of schooling at the end of the
period 1. In contrast, Denmark has a low Gini coefficient of 31 and a low differential
fertility rate of 0.35 at the beginning of period 1. Denmark has on average 6.5 years
of schooling at the beginning of period 1, and 8.5 years at the end of period 1.
Column (3) of Table 4.1 demonstrates that the initial level of inequality within a
country has a statistically significant negative effect on future levels of human capital.
The results are aligned with the findings of Chiu (1998). Column (3) additionally
demonstrates that an increase in the differential fertility rate by 1 child is associated
with a 0.2 year decrease in future educational attainment. The negative relationship
between DTFR and educational attainment is more likely a correlation rather than
a causal effect. The time periods used in the analysis are relatively short, with both
panels spanning at least 15 and at most 20 years, and the decrease in educational
attainment is unlikely to be the direct result of a changing differential fertility rate.
If a country has lower levels of inequality, total differential fertility rates may
4

The correlation coefficient between the differential fertility rate and the Gini coefficient is 0.45
and between initial years of schooling and the Gini coefficient is -0.19.
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not be as important in predicting future human capital levels, because more people
can get a better education, and we would expect the coefficient on DTFR to be low
and statistically insignificant. However, if a country is more unequal (has higher
Gini coefficients), differential fertility rate is expected to be negative and statistically
significant. Failure to include a Gini coefficient measure in the regressions may lead to
omitted variable bias, since the Gini coefficient is correlated with both the differential
fertility rate (0.47) and the average years of schooling (a correlation coefficient of 0.23). In addition Chiu (1998) theoretically demonstrated a negative relationship
between the income inequality and human capital accumulation.
The coefficients on the differential fertility rate and the interaction term between
the Gini coefficient and DTFR, reported in column (5) of Table 4.1, are jointly statistically significant at 5%. However, the direction of the relationship between DTFR
and average years of schooling changes depending on the initial level of income inequality within a country. For more unequal countries with income inequality levels
greater than 58.8, the differential fertility is positively related to the future educational attainment. In contrast, for more equal countries with Gini coefficients below
58.8, differential fertility is negatively related to the future level of human capital.
One explanation for this may be that differential fertility rate in more equal countries
increases because higher–educated women have fewer children, and, as a result, the
overall number of children in those countries decreases, lowering educational attainments. The vast majority of the countries in the sample are relatively more equal with
Gini coefficients below 58.8, and only Ecuador, Guatemala, Malawi, and Zimbabwe
have Gini coefficients above 58.8, implying that only in these four highly unequal
countries an increase in differential fertility is positively related to average years of
schooling.
Finally, countries with higher level of initial education like the United Kingdom
or Norway (initial years of schooling at the beginning of period 1 are 7.9 and 8.4,
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respectively), also have lower differential fertility rates (DTFR in period 1 is 0.43
for the United Kingdom and 0.54 for Norway). The children born to less educated
women in those countries, still have lower levels of education, however, the difference
between their education levels and that of highly educated children is smaller, due
to the fact that there are simply disproportionately fewer of them. However, in
countries like Niger or Mali, which have an initial education level of 0.5 years of
schooling at the beginning of period 2, and much higher fertility rate differentials
(DTFR in period 2 for Niger is 2.5 and for Mali 2.3), lower educated women will have
lower educated children, whose educational attainment will be significantly below the
education level of highly educated children, and due to the dis-proportionally higher
fraction of these children, lead to lower educational attainment in aggregate. The
results in column (4) of 4.1, however, suggest that differential fertility does not have
a statistically significant effect on future educational attainment, even after allowing
for a heterogeneous marginal effect based on the initial educational attainment.
To summarize, Table 4.1 demonstrates that the initial level of income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) plays an important part in determining future
levels of education. Furthermore, the relationship between the initial differential
fertility rate and future educational attainment varies based on the initial level of income inequality within a country, with more unequal countries exhibiting a positive
correlation with the future educational attainment and less unequal countries a negative correlation between the initial level of differential fertility and future educational
attainments.
So far we have discussed the effect of differential fertility rates on the total average
years of schooling, however, in the short run, primary enrollment ratios may be better
at capturing the effect of the exogenous changes in differential fertility rates on future
educational attainment for two reasons. First, the time periods used in our analysis
may not be long enough to capture the effect of changes in differential fertility rate
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on average years of schooling (the panels are only 15–20 years long). Second, average
years of schooling reflect the average educational attainment of all adults, so changes
in educational attainment during that period may not necessarily reflect the increase
in educational attainment of the children born during that period, but rather reflect
the total change in educational attainment averaged together with the older generation. Primary enrollment ratios, on the other hand, respond to changes in DTFR
more quickly and may be better at capturing the relationship between differential
fertility and educational attainments.
Table 4.2 reports the results with the primary enrollment ratio as a measure of
educational attainment. Columns (1)–(3) of Table 4.2, demonstrate that differential
fertility has a strong positive effect of future educational attainment. This positive relationship between the differential fertility rates and primary enrollment ratios could
be representative of a short–term effect. More specifically, an increase in differential fertility can be driven by either increased fertility of lower educated women or
decreased fertility of highly educated women. In the first case, the new children of
lower educated women are likely to at least be enrolled in primary school, thus increasing the enrollment ratios. However, whether they will attain higher levels of
education and have an effect on the average years of schooling in the longer run is
more uncertain. In the second case (decreased fertility of highly educated women)
the relationship is less clear. The total number of children decreases, thus we should
expect to see a corresponding decrease in the primary enrollment ratios. Since the
number of children born to lower educated women in this case remains the same
and some of them may remain enrolled in primary school, the total primary school
enrollment ratios should decrease due to the overall lower number of children born
to higher–educated mothers. The inconsistency of these two lines of reasoning may
suggest that the differential fertility most likely is increasing as a result of increased
births to lower–educated women, rather than decreased births to higher educated
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women.
Table 4.2: Panel Estimation with Fixed Effects. Dependent Variable is Total Primary
Enrollment Ratio.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

DTFR

6.668*** 7.896*** 8.351*** 7.272
(1.820) (1.918) (2.618) (6.388)

IniEducTotal

9.967*** 8.547*** 8.760*** 8.358*** 8.997***
(1.435) (1.522) (1.546) (2.862) (1.353)

LnRGDPcap

-0.235
4.401
(12.209) (9.485)

5.070
(9.817)

3.606
8.751
(14.025) (8.778)

3.252**
(1.517)

3.544
(2.232)

3.353
(2.595)

5.234**
(2.144)

0.131
(0.405)

0.027
(0.763)

0.057
(0.176)

GovtExpEducGDP(%)
Gini coeffcient
DTFRxIniEducTotal

-0.826
(2.741)

0.202
(1.066)

DTFRxGini

Obs.
Prob>F (DTFR+DTFRxIniEducTotal)
Prob>F (DTFR+DTFRxGini)
Period fixed effects
Country fixed effects

0.220***
(0.066)
48

48

48

48
0.18

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses

∗∗∗

p<0.01,

∗∗

p<0.05,

48
0.82
Y
Y
∗

p<0.1.

Using the government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP as a proxy
for the public provision of education has a positive effect on primary enrollment ratios.
Kremer and Chen (2002) demonstrated theoretically that fertility rate differentials
are greater in more unequal countries and reported the presence of multiple equilibria,
suggesting that a more generous provision of free public education may lead to the
reduction in differential fertility rates and income inequality as a result. My findings
suggest that increasing government expenditure on education by 1 percentage point
results in 5.2 percentage point increase in primary school enrollment (when controlling
for the differential effect of DTFR based on the initial level of income inequality within
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a country).
The results in column 3 of Table 4.2, imply that increasing differential fertility
by 1 child increases the primary enrollment ratio by 8.35 percentage points, after
controlling for the government expenditure on education,. The difference between
this finding and an insignificant effect of this control variable on the total average
years of schooling (reported in column (2) of Table 4.1), could be because changes
in the government education expenditures affect enrollment rates more quickly than
they affect average years of schooling.
Initial level of income inequality is not a significant predictor of future primary
enrollment rates (columns (3)–(5)). Column (5) allows for a heterogeneous marginal
effect of DTFR based on the initial level of income inequality within a country and
does not find it to be a determinant of future primary enrollment rates (DTFR and
DT F RxGini are not jointly statistically significant). Contrary to the results in Table
4.1, where the variable of interest is the total average years of schooling, the relationship between DTFR and primary enrollment ratios does not depend on the initial
level of income inequality.
The regression estimates reported in columns (4)–(5) of Table 4.2, do not find
that differential fertility has a statistically significant effect on future educational
attainment, even after allowing for a heterogeneous marginal effect based on the
initial educational attainment or initial income inequality level.

4.5

Conclusion
This chapter empirically tested the underlying hypothesis of De La Croix and

Doepke (2003) that differential fertility is a determinant of future educational attainment and the theoretical prediction of Chiu (1998) that higher initial income
inequality leads to lower aggregate human capital accumulation.
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De La Croix and Doepke (2003), previously found that differential fertility matters
for economic growth, however, they did not explicitly show that the negative effect of
DTFR happens through the human capital accumulation channel. Chiu (1998) have
predicted that highly unequal countries have lower future levels of human capital, but
have not empirically tested this prediction.
The main finding is that the initial differential fertility rate is negatively correlated
to the future average years of schooling, while the relationship between the differential
fertility rate and primary enrollment ratio is positive. This difference in the effect
of differential fertility on future educational attainment may be attributed to the
presence of short–term and log–term effects. Primary enrollment ratios are more
responsive to changes in differential fertility rates and capture the short–term effect
on educational attainments, while the reflection of the changes in differential fertility
rates on the average years of schooling takes a longer time and may be more indicative
of a long–term effect.
The relationship between the differential fertility rate and primary enrollment ratio
is positive, indicating that in the short–term primary enrollment ratios may increase
as a result of increased fertility of lower educated women, whose children are likely to
at least receive a minimum level of education and be enrolled in primary schooling.
On the other hand, in the long–term the correlation between differential fertility and
the average years of schooling is negative, suggesting that the relationship between
DTFR and educational attainments in the long run depends on whether the new
children of lower educated women will attain higher levels of education past primary
schooling, which is less certain. Interestingly, the correlation between differential
fertility and the average years of schooling is negative for more equal countries (Gini
coefficients below 58.8) and is positive for less equal countries (Gini coefficients above
58.8). In contrast, differential fertility does not have a statistically significant effect
on future educational attainment when controlling for a heterogeneous marginal effect

59

based on the initial level of educational attainment.
Kremer and Chen (2002) in their theoretical paper suggest that a more generous
provision of public education may reduce differential fertility rates and, as a result
the income inequality within a country. I find that a 1 percentage point increase
in government expenditure on education results in 5.2 percentage point increase in
primary school enrollment (when controlling for the heterogeneous marginal effect of
DTFR based on the initial level of income inequality within a country).
A secondary result is confirming the prediction of Chiu (1998) that the initial level
of income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) has a negative and significant
effect on future total average years of schooling.
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Appendix A

A.1

Chapter 1 Appendix

Data Description
1). World Trade Data. Data on world bilateral exports and imports by SITC
(Revision 2) 4–digit level codes come from the World integrated Trade Solution
(WITS) database (https://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/Restricted/Login.
aspx). Data in WITS originally come from the United Nations Commercial Trade
database, but are downloaded from the WITS website due to more “friendly” download procedures. Raw data files contain bilateral export and import data by year and
4 digit product types by industry codes. Export and import values are in millions of
2005 U.S. Dollars.
2). Gravity Measures. Data on bilateral distance, common official primary language, trade agreements come from (CEPII) The Centre d‘Etudes Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales—a French Institute for Research on the International
Economy (http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp). CEPII offers a
“square” gravity dataset for all world pairs of countries, for the period 1948 to 2006,
allowing the estimation of international trade flows as a function of GDP, population
and trade costs. An official or national language is defined as a language spoken by
at least 20% of the population of a country (Mayer and Zignago (2011))). If the
destination and the origin have a common official language, the independent variable “common official language” is defined to equal 1; otherwise, the variable equals
0. Geographical distance is defined as the distance (in kilometers) between the two
capital cities. Distances between each country pairs in the data were calculated from
the cities’ longitude and latitude using the great circle formula (Mayer and Zignago
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(2011)).
3). Real GDP Data. Data on the real GDP come from the Penn World Tables
(PWT 8.1), which contains information on relative levels of income, output, inputs
and productivity, covering 167 countries between 1950 and 2015 (http://www.rug.
nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/pwt-releases/pwt8.1).
4). Product Classification Data.

James Rauch data contain a categorization

of SITC (Rev.2) industries according to three possible product types: differentiated, reference–priced or commodity (homogeneous) (http://econweb.ucsd.edu/
~jrauch/research_international_trade.html). In Rauch’s data there are two
classifications “conservative” and “liberal”. “Conservative” category contains: 16,607
differentiated product types, 3,512 homogeneous or commodity product types and
8,119 reference price products. “Liberal” category contains: 15,687 differentiated
products, 5,030 homogeneous and 7,521 reference price products. According to Rauch
and Trindade (2002) a reference price category includes products which can not be
identified by either the brand or the producer. The reference price category therefore
allows to further disintegrate the commodities into homogeneous commodities, for
which the prices are available on the organized exchanges and commodities for which
the prices are not quoted on organized exchanges, thus making them relatively more
differentiated. The information contained in the price changes of the homogeneous
commodity products is enough to make the decision on the profitability of trade transaction, meaning that these products are familiar across countries, cultures, markets,
etc. and the immigrants’ knowledge is less likely to play a trade–enhancing part. On
the other hand, commodities which lack the reference price possess enough differentiation that they may require and benefit from the additional information beyond
the price to reveal the information regarding the profitability of the trade transaction
(these are the products which may be affected more by the immigrant “network”). I
use the “conservative” sample and the reference price category to assign the reference
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priced products to either commodities or differentiated as defined and proposed in
Rauch and Trindade (2002). In both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 I use these product categories to collapse bilateral exports and imports in aggregate, commodity and
differentiated exports and imports.
5). Immigrant Stock Data. Data on immigrants come from two sources. Data on
immigrant stock by destination and origin at five year intervals (1990–2005) come
from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social affairs (UNDES), collected and updated by the United Nations (http://www.un.org/en/development/
desa/population/publications/database/index.shtml). To supplement the intervening years, I also use data on immigrant flows, provided by Kim and Cohen
(2010), and interpolate the immigrant stock data for the remaining intervening years
(assuming constant “outflows” over the five year increments). A more detailed description of each source of immigrant data as well as the interpolation procedure is
described below.
5a). Immigrant Stock from UNDES. The total sample size for the UN immigrant
stock is 31,444 observations, 7,786 observations in each of the five year increments,
that is 7,786 observations in 1990, in 1995, 2000 and 2005 respectively. For the whole
sample, 888 or about 38.75% of those observations are zero. In the UNDES data,
zero (0) indicates that the value of the stock of immigrants is either zero, rounded to
zero or that data are not available. All the estimates of the stock data refer to the
mid–point (1 July) of each year indicated, thus making it a set of mid–year estimates
of the total international migrant stock by origin and destination for 1990, 1995,
2000, and 2005. The data on migrant stock may also indirectly contain information
on refugee stock. The coverage of refugees in population censuses is uneven and some
countries, when granting refugee status, count refugees in their population census as
any other international migrant.
5b). Immigrant Inflow Data from Kim and Cohen (2010). Kim and Cohen (2010)
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exclude the data on immigrant inflows from Croatia, Hungary, and United Kingdom
because there are too many missing values for those countries, thus, in my analysis I
also do not account for those counties. Whenever a country reported zero migrants,
Kim and Cohen (2010) excluded it from their analysis.
5c). Interpolating UNDES Immigrant Stock Data with Kim and Cohen (2010)
Immigrant Flow Data. I use the stock data for 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 and
then interpolated the missing numbers for immigrants 1991–2004, using the flow data
from Kim and Cohen (2010), to match the stock data from the UNDES. Since we
are dealing with inflows but not so much outflows (including deaths, etc.), I assumed
constant outflows over each five year interval to arrive at the estimate of the immigrant
stock available from UNDES migrant stock data for 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005.
6). Refugee Stock. The data on the stock of refugees come from the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Refugee statistics are generally based on
individual registration records, kept by the government of the host countries (http:
//popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series).
7). Major Episodes of Political Violence and Warfare (MEPV). Data on conflicts
come from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions,
1946-2014 collected by the Center for Systemic Peace (http://www.systemicpeace.
org/). MEPV defines major episodes of political violence as systematic episodes of
lethal violence resulting in at least 500 directly–related deaths over the course of the
episode. Episodes include international wars, civil wars, and ethnic violence, and are
assigned a societal-systemic magnitude impact ranging from 0 to 10. Categories 8–10
are hypothetical in the current data set, since most contemporary warfare locations
lack the necessary military technologies for conflict magnitudes over 7. I use ACTOTAL to create (Conf lict)jt . If the magnitude score of ACTOTAL is greater than 3,
I assign a 1 to the variable (Conf lict)jt , otherwise (Conf lict)jt is equal to zero.
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A.2

Chapter 2 Appendix

A.3

Appendix

World Exports Regression Results: Augmented Gravity Approach

Table A.1: Augmented Gravity Aggregate Exports
(Exports with no Ref)

(Exports with Ref)

Real GDP imm origin

0.251***
(0.072)

0.246***
(0.072)

Real GDP imm host

1.261***
(0.250)

1.238***
(0.250)

Conflict imm origin

0.026
(0.048)

0.024
(0.048)

RTA

-0.022
(0.035)

-0.035
(0.035)

Imm stock

0.077**
(0.034)

0.098***
(0.035)

Ref stock

-0.020***
(0.007)

Obs.
Exporter*Importer fixed effects
Destination fixed effects

5,509
Y
Y

5,509
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
Correlation between refugee stock and immigrant stock is 0.085. Both regressions have
year and exporter-importer f.e.
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Table A.2: Augmented Gravity Commodity and Differentiated Exports
(Comm noref)

(Comm ref)

(Diff noref)

(Diff ref)

0.039
(0.078)

0.023
(0.078)

0.354***
(0.081)

0.353***
(0.080)

Real GDP imm host

1.402***
(0.384)

1.331***
(0.384)

1.071***
(0.268)

1.066***
(0.268)

Conflict immi origin

0.007
(0.061)

-0.000
(0.061)

0.077
(0.055)

0.076
(0.055)

RTA

-0.015
(0.050)

-0.055
(0.048)

-0.017
(0.038)

-0.020
(0.038)

Imm stock

-0.055
(0.053)

0.013
(0.052)

0.151***
(0.036)

0.156***
(0.036)

Real GDP imm origin

Ref stock

Obs.
Exporter*Importer fixed effects
Year fixed effects

-0.063***
(0.010)
5,509
Y
Y

5,509
Y
Y

-0.004
(0.008)
5,509
Y
Y

5,509
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Correlation between refugee stock and immigrant stock is 0.085. All regressions have year and
exporter-importer f.e.
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World Imports Regression Results: Augmented Gravity Approach

Table A.3: Augmenetd Gravity Aggregate Imports
(Imports noref)

(Imports ref)

0.221
(0.288)

0.193
(0.287)

0.422***
(0.102)

0.416***
(0.101)

Conflict imm origin

-0.079
(0.053)

-0.081
(0.053)

Regional Trade Agreement

0.106*
(0.061)

0.089
(0.061)

Imm stock

0.091**
(0.040)

0.122***
(0.040)

Real GDP imm host
Real GDP imm origin

Ref stock

-0.029***
(0.010)

Obs.
Year fixed effects
Importer*Exporter fixed effects

4,903
Y
Y

4,903
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Correlation between refugee stock and immigrant stock
is 0.085. Both regressions have year and importer-exporter f.e.
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Table A.4: Augmented Gravity Commodity and Differentiated Imports
(Comm noref)

(Comm ref)

(Diff noref)

(Diff ref)

0.149
(0.369)

0.138
(0.369)

0.434
(0.344)

0.421
(0.342)

0.402***
(0.137)

0.399***
(0.137)

0.406***
(0.100)

0.403***
(0.100)

Conflict immi origin

-0.020
(0.062)

-0.021
(0.062)

-0.100*
(0.053)

-0.101*
(0.053)

RTA

0.035
(0.075)

0.029
(0.076)

0.110*
(0.061)

0.102*
(0.062)

Imm stock

0.093
(0.057)

0.105*
(0.057)

0.129***
(0.048)

0.143***
(0.048)

Real GDP immi host
Real GDP immi origin

Ref stock

Obs.
Year fixed effects
Importer*Exporter fixed effects

-0.011
(0.013)
4,903
Y
Y

4,903
Y
Y

-0.014
(0.012)
4,903
Y
Y

4,903
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Correlation between refugee stock and immigrant stock is 0.085. All regressions have year and
importer-exporter f.e.
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A.3.1

Descriptive Statistics: World Exports

Full Sample

Table A.5: Aggregate Exports Full Sample Descriptive Statistics.

Aggregate Exports (thousands of USD)
Commodity Exports (thousands of USD)
Differentiated Exports (thousands of USD)
Real GDP immi origin(mill 2005USD)
Real GDP immi host(mill 2005USD)
Distance (in km to most populated cities)
Regional Trade Agreement
Conflict immi host
Conflict immi origin
Common offical primary language
Immigrant stock
Refugee Stock

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

1,854,178
436,254
1,417,924
403,280
2,320,246
6,837
0.12
0.01
0.16
0.14
62,356
1,812

12,978,540
2,891,009
10,269,398
1,153,605
3,762,094
3,938
0.32
0.12
0.37
0.35
385,466
12,856

6
0
1
122
75,686
81
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1
1

362,876,032
75,639,502
288,179,645
12,564,300
12,564,300
18,825
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
10,309,054
350,000

Note: N=7,027. Statistics are for a total of 14 countries of export origin and 134 import
destinaitons over the period 1990-2005.
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HDFE Sample

Table A.6: Aggregate Exports HDFE Subsample Descriptive Statistics.

Aggregate Exports (thousands of USD)
Commodity Exports (thousands of USD)
Differentiated Exports (thousands of USD)
Real GDP immi origin (mill 2005USD)
Real GDP immi host (mill 2005USD)
Distance (in km to most populated cities)
Regional Trade Agreement
Conflict immi host
Conflict immi origin
Common offical primary language
Immigrant stock
Refugee Stock

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

1,875,521
444,181
1,431,340
432,739
2,451,594
6,837
0.13
0.06
0.28
0.14
69,875
1,712

13,332,275
3,010,721
10,508,132
1,210,404
3,937,212
3,910
0.33
0.23
0.45
0.34
423,694
10,566

29
0
15
383
78,138
81
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
8
1

362,876,032
75,639,502
288,179,645
12,564,300
12,564,300
18,419
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
10,309,054
245,238

Note: N=5,509. Statistics are for a total of 14 countries of export origin and 134 import
destinaitons over the period 1991-2005.
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A.3.2

Descriptive Statistics: World Imports

Full Sample

Table A.7: Aggregate Imports Full Sample Descriptive Statistics.

Aggregate Imports (thousands of USD)
Commodity Imports (thousands of USD)
Differentiated Imports (thousands of USD)
Real GDP imm host (mill 2005USD)
Real GDP imm origin (mill 2005USD)
Distance (in km to most populated cities)
Regional Trade Agreement
Conflict immi origin
Conflict immi host
Common offical primary language
Immigrant stock
Refugee stock

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

2,178,837
591,058
1,587,778
2,468,974
420,035
6,881
0.13
0.27
0.05
0.14
65,643
1,827

12,082,876
3,176,975
9,673,213
3,863,526
1,153,057
3,999
0.33
0.44
0.23
0.35
400,063
13,075

0
0
0
75,686
122
81
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
3
1

280,275,840
111,839,991
247,635,096
12,564,300
12,564,300
18,825
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
10,309,054
350,000

Note: N=6,493. Statistics are for a total of 14 import destination countries and 134 export
origin countries over the period 1990-2005.
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HDFE Sample

Aggregate Imports (thousands of USD)
Commodity Imports (thousands of USD)
Differentiated Imports (thousands of USD)
Real GDP immi host(mill 2005USD)
Real GDP immi origin (mill 2005USD)
Distance (in km to most populated cities)
Regional Trade Agreement
Conflict immi origin
Conflict immi host
Common offical primary language
Immigrant stock
Refugee stock

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

2,362,923
630,553
1,732,371
2,596,903
456,177
6,854
0.14
0.28
0.06
0.14
75,961
1,670

12,965,310
3,320,074
10,492,981
4,031,545
1,191,099
3,989
0.35
0.45
0.24
0.35
447,943
10,574

1
0
0
78,138
383
81
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
13
1

280,275,840
111,839,991
247,635,096
12,564,300
12,564,300
18,419
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
10,309,054
245,238

Note: N=4,903. Statistics are for a total of 14 import destination countries and 117 export
origin countries over the period 1991-2005.
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A.3.3

Robustness Check: Full Sample Augmented Gravity Results

Table A.8: Aggregate Exports Robustness Check.
(Exports no Ref)

(Exports with Ref)

Real GDP imm origin

0.300***
(0.058)

0.296***
(0.058)

Real GDP imm host

1.246***
(0.248)

1.226***
(0.248)

Conflict imm origin

0.175**
(0.068)

0.175**
(0.068)

RTA

-0.024
(0.035)

-0.037
(0.035)

Imm stock

0.047
(0.034)

0.070**
(0.035)

Ref stock

-0.021***
(0.007)

Obs.
Year fixed effects
Exporter*Importer fixed effects

5,899
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses
p<0.1. Both regressions have country-pair and year f.e.
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5,899
Y
Y
∗∗∗

p<0.01,

∗∗

p<0.05,

∗

Table A.9: Commodity and Differentiated Exports Robustness Check.
(Comm noref)

(Comm ref)

(Diff noref)

(Diff ref)

0.114*
(0.069)

0.101
(0.069)

0.389***
(0.065)

0.388***
(0.064)

Real GDP imm host

1.463***
(0.383)

1.406***
(0.383)

1.054***
(0.264)

1.050***
(0.265)

Conflict imm origin

0.194**
(0.081)

0.195**
(0.081)

0.225***
(0.078)

0.225***
(0.078)

RTA

0.010
(0.051)

-0.028
(0.050)

-0.028
(0.037)

-0.031
(0.038)

Imm stock

-0.072
(0.054)

-0.005
(0.053)

0.120***
(0.035)

0.125***
(0.036)

Real GDP imm origin

Ref stock

Obs.
Year fixed effects
Exporter*Importer fixed effects

-0.062***
(0.010)
5,899
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses
regressions have country-pair and year f.e.
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-0.005
(0.008)

5,899
Y
Y
∗∗∗

p<0.01,

5,899
Y
Y
∗∗

p<0.05,

5,899
Y
Y
∗

p<0.1. Both

Table A.10: Aggregate Imports Robustness Check.
(Imports noref)

(Imports ref)

0.246
(0.298)

0.229
(0.298)

Real GDP imm origin

0.540***
(0.085)

0.537***
(0.085)

Conflict imm origin

-0.111**
(0.052)

-0.113**
(0.052)

RTA

0.125**
(0.060)

0.115*
(0.061)

Imm stock

0.106***
(0.040)

0.126***
(0.041)

Real GDP imm host

Ref stock

-0.017
(0.011)

Obs.
Year fixed effects
Importer*Exporter fixed effects

5,339
Y
Y

5,339
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05,
∗ p<0.1. Both regressions have country-pair and year f.e.
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Table A.11: Commodity and Differentiated Imports Robustness Check.
(Comm noref)

(Comm ref)

(Diff noref)

(Diff ref)

0.065
(0.380)

0.058
(0.379)

0.372
(0.349)

0.370
(0.348)

0.530***
(0.115)

0.528***
(0.115)

0.257***
(0.090)

0.256***
(0.089)

Conflict imm origin

-0.059
(0.063)

-0.059
(0.063)

-0.131**
(0.054)

-0.132**
(0.054)

RTA

0.055
(0.075)

0.050
(0.076)

0.135**
(0.062)

0.133**
(0.062)

Imm stock

0.132**
(0.060)

0.141**
(0.061)

0.091*
(0.050)

0.093*
(0.049)

Real GDP imm host
Real GDP imm origin

Ref stock

Obs.
Year fixed effects
Importer*Exporter fixed effects

-0.007
(0.015)
5,339
Y
Y

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses
regressions have country-pair and year f.e.
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-0.002
(0.012)

5,339
Y
Y
∗∗∗

p<0.01,

5,339
Y
Y
∗∗

p<0.05,

5,339
Y
Y
∗

p<0.1. All

A.4

Chapter 3 Appendix

Descriptive Statistics: U.S. Exports

Table A.12: U.S. Aggregate Exports Descriptive Statistics.
Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

Aggregate Exports (thousands of USD)
4,597,715 24,096,064
74
362,876,032
Commodity Exports (thousands of USD)
956,258
4,572,596
3
74,696,391
Differentiated Exports (thousands of USD) 3,641,456 19,593,791
13
288,179,645
Real GDP imm origin (mill 2005US)
265,433
661,796
383
7,522,393
Real GDP U.S. (mill 2005USD)
10,523,400 1,404,502 7,875,283 12,564,300
Distance (in km to most populated cities)
8,667
3,129
548
16,180
Regional Trade Agreement
0.03
0.17
0.00
1.00
Conflict imm origin
0.15
0.36
0.00
1.00
Common official primary language
0.23
0.42
0.00
1.00
Immigrant stock
254,162
896,404
717
10,309,054
Refugee Stock
3,913
20,040
1
245,238
Note: N=1,035. Statistics are for the U.S. and its 125 export partners (immigrant origin
countries) over the period 1990-2005.
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Descriptive Statistics: U.S. Imports

Table A.13: U.S. Aggregate Imports Descriptive Statistics.
Mean
Aggregate Imports (thousands of USD)
Commodity Imports (thousands of USD)
Differentiated Imports (thousands of USD)
Real GDP U.S. (mill 2005USD)
Real GDP imm origin (mill 2005USD)
Distance (in km to most populated cities)
Regional Trade Agreement
Conflict imm origin
Common official primary language
Immigrant stock
Refugee stock

7,771,640
2,035,245
5,736,394
10,597,302
313,703
8,430
0.04
0.15
0.24
265,876
4,391

S.D.

Min

Max

26,503,403
117
280,275,840
6,781,073
0
111,839,991
21,557,796
12
247,635,096
1,358,858 7,875,283 12,564,300
729,885
383
7,522,393
3,168
548
16,180
0.19
0.00
1.00
0.36
0.00
1.00
0.43
0.00
1.00
939,246
797
10,309,054
20,315
1
245,238

Note: Statistics are for the U.S. and its 100 import partners over the period 1990-2005.
N=1,028.
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A.5
A.5.1

Chapter 4 Appendix
Data Description

1. (HK)it —Total years of schooling for both sexes for a given country in a given
year from Barro and Lee (2013). Ivory Coast does not have (HK)it available in Barro
and Lee (2013) and is not part of the sample for the regressions using (HK)it .
2. (P rimEnrollRatio)it —Total primary education enrollment ratio Barro and
Lee (2013). There are no data available for Bangladesh, Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Haiti, Jordan, Lesotho, Liberia, Namibia, Pakistan, Romania,
Rwanda, Togo, Zambia. Ivory Coast is not part of the regressions using the average
years of schooling (Barro and Lee (2013) lack data), but it is included in the regressions using primary enrollment ratios, since Barro and Lee (2013) have enrollment
ratios for it.
3. (DT F R)it−1 —Differential total fertility rate (difference between fertility rates
of women with low level of education and fertility rates of women with high level of
education). In this paper, DTFR is measured in different years for different countries
but generally towards the beginning and middle of the two periods (period 1 is 19741982, and period 2 is 1985-1993). For example, Colombia has a DTFR measure in
1976 and 1986, so the first differential fertility measure will be in period 1, and the
second in period 2. Countries for which DTFR is measured only once, like Denmark in
1975 or Burundi in 1987, will only be observed in period 1 or 2, respectively. DTFR
is negatively correlated with real GDP per capita (correlation coefficient of -0.33),
and with initial level of education (correlation coefficient of -0.3). DTFR is positively
correlated with the Gini coefficient, with a correlation coefficient of 0.47.
4. (HK)it−1 —Initial total years of schooling for both sexes measured at the beginning of the period. The (HK)it−1 either total years of schooling for both sexes
measured in 1975 or in 1985, a year after the beginning of period 1 and in the exact
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year measuring beginning of period 2. The data come from Barro and Lee (2013).
5. (Gini)it−1 —Initial average income inequality measure ranging from 0 to 100 (0
denotes perfect equality, 100—perfect inequality). Deininger and Squire (1996) do
not have Gini coefficients available for all of the countries and years in our data. I use
the earliest available Gini coefficient for a given period. For countries when Deininger
and Squire (1996) do not have Gini coefficients, we use Ginis from De La Croix
and Doepke (2003). For example, if Deininger and Squire (1996) measure Ginis for
Bangladesh in 1977 and 1986, Bangladesh appears in both periods (1976 in period 1
and 1986 in period 2). Countries which appear only once, for example, Spain with
Gini measured in 1980, appears only in period 1 or 2 (Spain only in period 1) . There
are no Gini coefficients available for Sudan at all and for Senegal in period 1.
6. (GDP cap)it−1 —Initial level of per capita GDP, measured at the beginning of
the period, so in 1975 or 1985, respectively. The data come from the Penn World
Tables dataset improved and expanded in Feenstra et al. (2015).
7. (GovtExpEducGDP (%))it−1 —Initial government expenditure on education as
a percentage of GDP, measured at the beginning of the period when available, otherwise within the period. For example for period 1, it is measured in 1974 for Denmark, Spain, and Ghana and in 1977 for Ecuador and in 1979 for Colombia. There
are 6 countries for which there are no data available for this variable: Benin, Brazil,
Namibia, Romania, Senegal and Sudan. There are 10 countries for which this variable is available only for one of the two periods: El Salvador (period 1), Haiti (period
2), Indonesia (period 2), Liberia (period 1), Mexico (period 2), Niger (period 2 ),
Paraguay (period 2), Peru (period 1), Poland (period 2), Romania (period 2), United
States (period 2). Initial government expenditure on education is available at the
beginning of the period for 42 out of 48 countries.
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Descriptive Statistics Full Sample

Table A.14: Descriptive Statistics.

EndingPrimEnrollRatio(%)
EndinghEducTotal
DTFR
IniEducTotal
RGDPcap (in mil. 2011USD)
GovtExpEducGDP(%)
Gini coeffcient
DTFRxIniEducTotal
DTFRxGini

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

90.69
5.52
2.26
4.07
6,513
3.68
45.52
8.25
109.28

13.47
2.11
1.41
1.96
5,802
1.66
10.01
6.51
79.51

47.33
0.94
-0.60
0.54
776
0.83
24.20
-4.52
-25.03

100.00
10.07
5.10
8.44
20,508
7.42
68.26
22.23
345.93

Note: N=61. Statistics are for the full sample of countries for both periods. There
are no data on primary enrollment ratios for 13 countries.
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Descriptive Statistics by Period

Table A.15: Period 1 (1974-82) Descriptive Statistics. N=29

EndinghEducTotal
DTFR
IniEducTotal
DTFRxIniEducTotal
Gini coeffcient
DTFRxGini
RGDPcap (in mil. 2011USD)
GovtExpEducGDP(%)

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

5.60
2.18
4.09
7.85
44.04
102.43
7,808
3.80

2.16
1.55
2.07
6.20
10.42
82.11
6,732
1.60

1.87
0.22
0.86
1.13
24.20
5.89
1,043
1.13

10.07
5.10
8.44
21.78
68.00
345.93
20,508
7.35

Note: Statistics are for the sample of countries from period 1.

Table A.16: Period 2 (1985-93) Descriptive Statistics. N=32

EndinghEducTotal
DTFR
IniEducTotal
DTFRxIniEducTotal
Gini coeffcient
DTFRxGini
RGDPcap (in mil. 2011USD)
GovtExpEducGDP(%)

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

4.79
2.26
3.41
7.38
44.80
105.08
3,493
3.37

2.10
1.13
1.75
6.09
9.80
66.96
2,893
1.60

0.94
-0.60
0.54
-4.52
28.90
-25.03
776
0.83

9.15
4.20
7.54
22.23
68.26
259.39
12,175
7.42

Note: Statistics are for the sample of countries from period 2.
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A.5.2

Robustness Check by Period

Table A.17: Results by Period. Dependent variable is Total Average Years of Schooling.

DTFR
IniEducTotal

1(a)

1(b)

1(c)

2(a)

2(b)

2(c)

-0.161
(0.197)

-0.143
(0.203)

0.034
(0.217)

-0.475*
(0.275)

-0.475*
(0.275)

0.645
(0.538)

1.000*** 1.014*** 1.121*** 0.920*** 0.920*** 1.096***
(0.123) (0.128) (0.087) (0.151) (0.151) (0.078)

LnRGDPcap

-0.143
(0.178)

-0.140
(0.185)

-0.195
(0.194)

0.234
(0.191)

0.234
(0.191)

0.238
(0.194)

GovtExpEducGDP(%)

0.049
(0.046)

0.042
(0.053)

0.025
(0.057)

0.178**
(0.075)

0.178**
(0.075)

0.142*
(0.073)

0.003
(0.011)

0.009
(0.016)

-0.009
(0.011)

-0.009
(0.011)

0.028
(0.027)

0.087
(0.065)

0.087
(0.065)

Gini coeffcient
DTFRxIniEducTotal

0.063
(0.048)

0.056
(0.051)

DTFRxGini

Obs.

0.000
(0.004)
29

29

29

-0.015
(0.010)
32

32

32

Note: There are no Gini coefficients available for Sudan and for Senegal in period
1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
Results in columns 1(a)-(c) refer to period=1 (1974-82); Results in columns 2(a)-(c)
refer to period=2 (1985-93).
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Table A.18: Preliminary Results by Period. Dependent variable is Total Primary
Enrollment Ratio.
1(a)

1(b)

1(c)

2(a)

2(b)

2(c)

DTFR

4.241
(5.050)

5.399
(5.271)

0.290
(4.580)

-0.693
(8.478)

-0.693
(8.478)

5.191
(17.045)

IniEducTotal

6.330**
(2.759)

7.528**
(3.295)

5.230***
(1.483)

2.349
(3.211)

2.349
(3.211)

3.904*
(1.966)

LnRGDPcap

1.234
(3.916)

1.648
(3.528)

2.926
(3.003)

2.466
(4.806)

2.466
(4.806)

2.038
(4.562)

GovtExpEducGDP(%)

-0.727
(1.225)

-1.126
(1.333)

-0.833
(1.294)

0.648
(1.197)

0.648
(1.197)

0.418
(1.213)

0.310
(0.213)

0.156
(0.285)

-0.071
(0.398)

-0.071
(0.398)

0.052
(1.168)

0.694
(1.381)

0.694
(1.381)

Gini coeffcient
DTFRxIniEducTotal

-0.645
(1.115)

-1.144
(1.272)

DTFRxGini

Obs.

0.017
(0.092)
25

25

25

-0.044
(0.352)
23

23

23

Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
Results in columns 1(a)-(c) refer to period=1 (1974-82); Results in columns 2(a)-(c)
refer to period=2 (1985-93).

A.5.3

List of Countries by Period

1. Period 1 (1974–1982): Bangladesh, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Ghana, Italy, Ivory Coast,
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Lesotho, Morocco, Malaysia, Norway, Pakistan,
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Syria, Trinidad&Tobago, Venezuela, United Kingdom.
2. Period 2 (1985–1993): Bangladesh, Botswana, Burundi,Central African Republic, Cameroon, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala,
Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Mexico, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Paraguay, Rwanda, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad&Tobago, Tunisia,
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Turkey, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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